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Nestucca spill took place off the B.C. coast. Yet, while there has been much discussion, domestic
legislation remains virtually unaltered at the present time. The authors find that the status quo must be
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be achieved. Mere "tinkering" with the existing regime has proved to be largely ineffective.
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A BLACK (AND RISING?) TIDE:
CONTROLLING MARITIME OIL
POLLUTION IN CANADAQ
By SuzANNE HAWKES* AND R. MICHAEL M'GONiGLE**
A series of dramatic oil spills in recent years has once again drawn critical
attention to the nature and adequacy of existing domestic and international
legislation regarding ship source oil pollution. Predictably, legislators and
policy makers have responded with a plethora of studies, reviews, and
consultations. However, past improvements to the domestic and international
regimes have traditionally been slow and incremental, at best. In Canada,
approximately three years have passed since the Nestucca spill took place off
the B.C. coast. Yet, while there has been much discussion, domestic legislation
remains virtually unaltered at the present time. The authors find that the
status quo must be changed substantially, in order for real and significant
improvement in marine environmental protection to be achieved. Mere
"tinkering" with the existing regime has proved to be largely ineffective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early January 1989, waves of thick crude oil began washing
ashore on the beaches of Pacific Rim National Park, covering miles of
shoreline and marine habitat. Ten days earlier, 875,000 litres of Bunker
C oil had been loosed when the barge Nestucca collided with its own
tugboat off Grays Harbor, Washington. Gale force winds swept the oil
up the coast to Vancouver Island, catching the Canadian Coast Guard
completely by surprise and causing the worst oil spill the Canadian West
Coast had ever experienced.

1992]

A Black (And Rising?) Tide

Less than four months later, the Erxon Valdez, after grounding
on Bligh Reef, loosed 41,000,000 litres of crude oil into the pristine
arctic waters of Prince William Sound, Alaska. Observers around the
world watched the spill gradually spread over hundreds of miles of
remote coastline, while control efforts were futile. The extent of the
spill was staggering; it may take decades for the area to recover. The
spill has earned the distinction as being the worst in American history
and one of the worst in the world.
Months later, the Exon Philadelphia, sister ship to the Valdez,
lost power just before it was to enter the Straits of Juan de Fuca. For
several hours, it drifted a few miles offshore, fully laden with Alaskan
crude oil. Fortunately, weather conditions were unusually calm that day,
and tugboats were able to reach the supertanker before she drifted
ashore.1 Had the ship's power gone down a few hours later, during its
passage through the narrow straits and fast moving waters outside the
Cherry Point refinery, an environmental disaster for the entire Puget
Sound and Juan de Fuca coastline would have been possible.
Subsequent American spills read like a litany of things gone
wrong. On 2 March 1989, 114,600 litres of crude and fuel oil were
spilled into the waters of Oahu-fifteen miles from Hawaii's most
popular beach-after yet another Exxon vessel, this time the Fxon
Houston, grounded on a coral reef while unloading oil at a local
refinery.2 Approximately 1,319,500 litres of home heating oil were
spilled off the coast of Rhode Island on 23 June 1989, after the Greek
flagged tanker, World Prodigy, ran aground on Brenton Reef. Less than
two hours later, a u.s. oil-carrying barge collided with a Panamanian
flagged chemical tankship in the Houston shipping channel, spilling
about 1,137,500 litres of "heavy slurry oil." The next day, about
1,365,000 litres of number six oil (a heavy oil which quickly sinks below
the water's surface) were spilled into the Delaware River when the
1 Exxon Oil Spill: Hearings before the National Ocean Policy Study and the Subcommittee on

Merchant Marine of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation: First session on

Cleanup, Containment, and Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill and Spill Prevention and
Maritime Regulations, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., (Part 2, 10 May and 20 July 1989) (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) at 286 [hereinafter Exxon Oil Spill Hearings Part 2].
2 Exxon Oil Spill: Hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
on the Exxon Valdez Spill and its Environmental and Maritime Implications, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(Part 1, 6 April 1989) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) at 8 (statement
of Senator Inouye) [hereinafter Exxon Oil Spill Hearings Part 1].
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Uruguayan tanker,
PresidenteRivera, ran aground near Marcus Hook,
3
Pennsylvania.
Despite two decades of quiet progress since the notorious Torrey
Canyon spill off the coast of Cornwall in 1967, this remarkable series of
accidents has exposed the serious gaps and deficiencies in the current
legislative and regulatory regime and the inadequate state of
preparedness and response capabilities within Canada and the United
States. Once more, the high media profile of these recent spills has led
Canadians to an abrupt awakening-or rather, reawakening-to the
extreme risks posed by the marine transport of oil. Old and contentious
issues regarding accident prevention standards, spill clean-up, emergency preparedness, liability, and compensation have resurfaced. What
had become a plodding, internal debate over ship pollution prevention
policy again came under public scrutiny.
Predictably, the immediate response in Canada has been political, leading to a range of promises and reassurances to an alarmed
public. Separate provincial and federal commissions on the adequacy of
pollution prevention and response capability were launched and have
now reported. But it is all a familiar pattern. The aftermath of any
major oil spill is inevitably marked by a flurry of bureaucratic and
political activity. Without exception, numerous reforms regarding
prevention, clean-up, and economic imperatives are at least discussed in
the wake of the media attention and public outrage accompanying high
profile oil spills. The basic assumption that oil will continue to be
transported by tanker-indeed, that such transportation will increaseremains, however, unchallenged. With that assumption goes a concern
about the costs of improved regulations. In the past, the result has been
progress for sure, but slow progress. Progress which might lead to
fundamental changes in the legal regime has not come easily and often
has not come at all.
After the Nestucca spill, the Canadian Coast Guard was first off
the mark. In the media, the Coast Guard was castigated for its
ineffectiveness in responding to the spill, and it initiated its own internal

3 Three Recent Oil Spills: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Protection of
the Committee on Environment and Public Works on Oil Spills in the Coastal Waters of Rhode
Island, the Delaware River, and the Houston Shop Channel, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) at 52-55 (statement of Admiral Paul A. Yost)
[hereinafter Three Recent Oil Spills].
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review shortly after the clean up was completed.4 The agency's final
report was submitted to the federal government on 1 July 1989. 5 6This
was an "internal" review and has never been released to the public.
The palpable anger of the citizens of British Columbia
demanded a political response as well. In the spring of 1989, Premier
Bill Vander Zalm appointed Canada's most respected critic of shipping
pollution, the former Vancouver Island MP David Anderson, to report
on the issue as it affects the West Coast. Anderson's report and recom"Washington/British
mendations were submitted to the newly formed
7
Columbia Oil Spill Task Force" late in the year.
Because the mandate for oil spill response rests with a federal
agency, public outrage was directed largely toward Ottawa. Calls for a
national royal commission were frequent. Indeed, a group with the
unlikely name of "Call for Inquiry" was formed and continues to operate
today as a monitoring and pressure group. In response to these
demands, the federal government finally appointed the $3 million Public
Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability
on 9 June 1989.q The commission was to be chaired by Vancouver
lawyer David Brander-Smith. Its mandate was not, however, to conduct

4 The internal review commenced in April 1989 directed by Environment Canada in

conjunction with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard. See
FinalReport of the Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability:

Protecting Our Waters (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply & Services, September 1990) (Chair: D.
Brander-Smith) at 3 [hereinafter ProtectingOur Waters].
5 Federal Internal Review of Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability (Ottawa:
Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished]. The Federal Internal Review consists of numerous

separate papers submitted from the various Coast Guard Regional offices and other federal
departments. Hereinafter, all such submissions will be cited simply as the Federal Internal Review
followed by the title of the individual paper.
6 It appears, however, that the individual papers comprising the review are available upon
request. The Coast Guard made a copy of the entire review available to the authors in June 1990.
7 D. Anderson, Report to the Premieron Oil Transportationand Oil Spills (Victoria: Policy &

Planning Branch, Ministry of Environment, November 1989). This committee is comprised of
officials from British Columbia, Washington, and more recently, Oregon and Alaska. Its mandate is
"to enhance existing means of prevention and explore new ones, research and implement means of
financial recovery for both the province and the state, and establish ongoing technology sharing."
See Department of Ecology, State of Washington, Focus: Oil Spill Task Force (Olympia, Wash.:

Department of Ecology, June 1989) [information paper].
8 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4.
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a full blown commission inquiry, but merely to hold informal hearings on
the topic from coast to coast. 9
In fact, despite the clear interest of the public in the prevention
and control of oil spills, the response of all levels of government in 1989
was not sympathetic to extensive public involvement. For example,
Brander-Smith's West Coast hearings began during the height of the
fishing season, When the majority of native and non-native fishermenmany of whom had suffered the most direct effects of the Nestucca
incident-were unable to attend. In another case, Vancouver participants were informed only eight days in advance of the hearings, when
meaningful preparatory work and informed public participation was
virtually impossible.10 The panel's report was submitted to the federal
Minister of the Environment on 24 October 1990.11
In this study, we will describe the current state of ship source oil
pollution and analyze the Canadian legal and regulatory regime in the
areas of pollution prevention, liability, and compensation. In so doing,
we will critically examine the nature of the contemporary political and
economic context in which this regime has been created and reformed,
both domestically and internationally. In our review, we will explore
past trends which have lead to the present law and anticipate what
aspects of the law require change in the years ahead. Our recommendations will take into account the findings of the federal and
provincial reviews.
Within this broader context, the Canadian West Coast, which has
suffered such recent damage, will be examined as a detailed illustration
of the state of the law and especially its implementation. This region is
also particularly vulnerable to oil spills due to the intense offshore
tanker traffic from Alaska. Like the East Coast, the area has a rich and
sensitive coastal environment, a lucrative fishing industry, and an increas-

9 For a list of hearing locations and dates, see Protecting Our Waters, ibid. at 239. For an
outline of the Panel's mandate, see chapter 1.
10 Hearings were initially held in Vancouver on 25-27 July and in Victoria on 28 July. The
Panel later returned to the West Coast to hold hearings again in Vancouver on 29 November,
Tofino on 30 November, and finally, in Vancouver again on 1 December, the last day of hearings.
Ibid.at 239. Vancouver residents were informed of the 25 July hearing, the first to be held by the
Panel, only on 17 July 1989. See the notice contained in the Vancouver Sun (17 July 1989) B5.
11 Transport Canada, Release 240/90, "Government Responds to Report on Tanker Safety
and Marine Spills Response Capability" (2 November 1990).
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ingly significant tourist industry. The treatment of the issue on the West
Coast is also driven by the presence of strong environmental and native
interests.
II. BACKGROUND: OIL AND TROUBLED WATERS
A. A Growing Threat: Oil Shipments and Tankers
It goes almost without saying that the past fifty years have seen a
dramatic rise in the international shipment of oil. Oil has been, and
remains, the foundation of the industrial world, leading to huge increases in oil consumption since the second world war. Between 1963
and the Arab oil embargo of 1973, exports of crude oil alone more than
tripled from 10.5 million barrels per day to almost 32 million barrels per
day.1 2 With this rise in consumption, there has been a corresponding
expansion in the size of the world tanker fleet. In 1938, the world tanker
fleet totalled 11.6 million tons. By 1980, tanker traffic peaked at 175
million tons, comprising 41 per cent of the total global merchant fleet.1 3
Although there was a slight decline in the registered tonnage of tankers
in the early 1980s due to the decreased demand for oil in those years,
investment in both used or "newbuilding" tanker tonnage has again
begun to increase. By 1988, ordering of new tanker tonnage stood at
about 22 million dead weight tons (dwt), 14 representing an increase of

12

j. Curtis, "Vessel-source Oil Pollution and MarPol 73/78: An International Success Story?"

(1985) 15 Env. L. 679 at 679. In 1973, the OPEC nations' oil embargo resulted in substantially
higher prices in the world market, spurring the heavily oil consuming nations into action that lead
temporarily to enhanced oil conservation, greater independence from foreign oil reserves, and the
tentative development of alternative energy sources. In recent years, however, crude oil prices have
been relatively cheap and consumption has once again risen dramatically.
13

KA. Gourlay, Poisonersof the Seas (London: Zed Books, 1988) at 61.

14 The deadweight tonnage (dwt) of a ship is defined as "the amount of cargo, fuel, stores,
crew, and crew affects it can hold." See Exxon Oil Hearings Part 2, supra, note 1 at 348 (statement
of T.S. Wyman, Chevron Shipping Company).
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approximately 8 per cent of the contemporary world tanker fleet.15
Currently, the world tanker fleet consists of almost 250 million dwt.16
At the same time, the bulk of the existing tanker fleet is aging.
In 1983, almost one-third of the world fleet was fifteen years old, the age
when they begin to show signs of stress.17 In the United States, the
average age of the active tanker fleet is eighteen years.18 This aging fleet
has been likened to a "time bomb," with some still active tankers dating
as far back as 1945.19 Many of these vessels regularly ply the waters of
the Canadian West Coast.
B. The Case of Canada'sWest Coast
Extensive transportation of oil along the West Coast began in
the early 1970s. Following the discovery in 1968 of oil at Prudhoe Bay,
Alaska,20 a debate began over the safest and most economically viable
method of transporting the oil to market. Canada created the Berger
Commission to consider the issue, but before it had even begun assessing
the impacts of an overland gas pipeline route through Canada, the u.s.
oil industry (citing "too many time consuming and exhaustive studies")
opted for a pipeline running from Prudhoe Bay to holding tanks at the
port of Valdez and running from there to refineries on the American
West Coast via a fleet of seventy-four tankers? 1 This is the so-called
Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), and most of the TAPS tankers were
bound for the oil refinery at Cherry Point, Washington. In order to
assuage considerable public concern about the potential environmental

15 "Promising future for tanker trade, predicts Troodos
ManagerlShippingNewsInternational(September 1989) 64.
16 International Maritime Organization, "Preventing Marine
Threat" Focuson IMO (September 1989) 1 [hereinafter "Preventing
17 By 31 December 1982, over two-thirds of the global tanker

Vice President" Lloyd's Ship
Pollution: The Environmental
Marine Pollution"].
fleet had been built after 1969.

See Curtis, supra,note 12 at 682.
18

Wyman, supra, note 14.

19 "Aging tankers: time bombs on Valdez oil route?" The Seattle Times/Seattle
Post-Inteligencer(2 April 1989) A12 (reprinted from the Journal of Commerce) [hereinafter "Aging
tankers"].
20
V. Cernetig, Jr., "Black Waters" (1989) 8:4 Equinox 40 at 43.
21

Ibid. See also Anderson, supra, note 7 at 18.
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impacts of the route, the oil industry and the u.s. Coast Guard promised
to implement only the highest calibre of ship design, crew, and navigation standards and to ensure the existence of state of the art clean-up
equipment and response procedures. 2 2 At one point in the mid-1970s,
new oil ports were being considered for the B.C. coast, but were rejected
following the results of a public inquiry. 23
As these ships pass down the coast of the Queen Charlotte
Islands, Vancouver Island and through the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the
threat to West Coast waters is sizeable. Every week, about sixteen
loaded TAPS tankers leave the Port of Valdez. On average, 2.5 of these
leave or enter the Juan de Fuca Strait each day. Despite the promises,
the Tanker Advisory Institute in New York has rated the quality of the
Alaskan fleet as averaging only 2.6 on a scale of one to five, with many of
24
the vessels receiving the lowest ratings of dependability possible.
Between 1984 and 1986, 52 per cent of all u.s. tanker casualties involved
2
TAPS trade vessels. 5 Many estimate that the Strait of Juan de Fuca is
26
next in line for a major oil spill.
The threat of pollution to the inland waters of the West Coast is
also growing substantially. In the Port of Vancouver, crude oil exports
have increased dramatically-from 61,000 tonnes in 1984 to 430,000
tonnes in 1986, to 1,025,000 tons in 1988. This is a sixteen-fold increase
in just four years-all undertaken without any public review. 2 7 Further
increases in shipments through Vancouver will occur with the recently
approved expansion in activities of the TransMountain Pipeline
22 These included state of the art clean-up equipment, twenty-four hour monitoring which

would be "similar in concept to airport control systems," specially trained crews, and double hulls
on all tankers. However, without statutory backing, many of these provisions were gradually

eroded. In fact, most of the promises were not met at all. See Exxon Oil Hearings Part 2, supra,
note 1 at 9 (statement of C. Curtis on behalf of the Oceanic Society). See also Cernetig, supra, note

20 at 43.
23 The so-called "West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry" was chaired by the noted natural resources

lawyer, Dr. Andrew Thompson. His report, entitled West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry: Statement of
Proceedings (Vancouver, B.C.: West Coast Oil Ports Inquiry, 1978), was submitted in February
1978.
24

See "Aging tankers," supra, note 19.

25

Curtis, supra, note 12 at 12.

26

Cernetig, supra, note 20 at 42.

27 Vancouver Port Corporation, Vancouver Port Corporation, 1987-1988: Statistics by

Commodity (Vancouver: Vancouver Port Corporation, 1988).
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Company based in Burnaby. Total oil exports are expected to double to
two million tons annually by the year 1992,28 and the number of tankers
will rise from one or two to four per monthP If a second pipeline from
Edmonton to Burnaby is approved by the National Energy Board, export
may increase to a staggering nine million tons annually 30 In addition, a
new trade in methyl tertiary butyl ether (MmnE) has been approved by the
National Energy Board, which will further increase the tanker and barge
traffic in the Port of Vancouver and Burrard Inlet.31 Already, the port is
a heavily used urban harbour (a very hazardous place from which to
export oil), with increasing pollution problems and traffic congestion.
Safety standards have been widely criticized. With these trends, it is
questionable whether major spills can be avoided without significant
improvements to the regulatory framework and changes in the patterns
of oil transportation and consumption.
C. Oil and Water Do Mix
1. The scale of the problem
Oil pollution has become a fact of life on a global scale. The
United Nation's Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of
Marine Pollution (GESAMP) notes that New Zealand is now the only
place on the planet where "oil pollution is not a serious problem."3 2 Tar
balls and other oil based residues proliferate the world's beaches, particularly those near tanker shipping lanes. 33
Tankers and other ships cause oil pollution in two ways: through
accidental discharges (as discussed above) and through operational or
intentional discharges. Operational discharges occur in a number of
ways. One of the most significant of these takes place when cargo tanks

28
29

ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 186.
Anderson, supra,note 7 at 21.

30

ProtectingOur Waters, supra,note 4 at 199.
31 Ibid.
32 Cited in Gourlay, supra, note 13 at 113.
33 National Research Council et aL, Oil in the Sea: Inputs, Fates and Effects (Washington,
D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985) at 12 [hereinafter Oil in the Sea].

1992]

A Black (And Rising?) Tide

are used to store oil and ballast water alternately. Oil residues from the
cargo tanks become mixed with seawater, resulting in oily "departure
ballast," which must be removed prior to arrival at the loading port.
Further oily residues result when cargo tanks are cleaned to reduce the
build up of sludge.
Operational discharges constitute the single most significant
source of oil pollution generated by ships. As such, for years, they were
virtually the exclusive focus of international maritime law. The 1954
InternationalConventionfor the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil3 4
was the first major treaty to deal with the issue. It dealt almost solely
with operational discharges, for which, among other things, it established
a "prohibition zone" of fifty miles from shore, within which the discharge
of oil and oily residues was to be tightly controlled. As was common in
those days, the 1954 Convention was based largely upon the concept of
"self-regulation" and "self-reporting," whereby vessels were to keep "oil
record books" recording their own operational discharges. Again, as was
common, the ability to prosecute contraveners rested exclusively with
the flag state. The system was woefully inadequate, and operational
pollution grew in tandem with the growth in the international fleet.35
Exact figures on the total quantity of oil discharged into the
ocean as a result of marine transportation are difficult to obtain due to
sporadic and incomplete reporting, variable estimating methods, and the
often voluntary nature of reporting of spills. 3 6 The u.s. National
Academy of Sciences estimated in 1985 that such discharges range from
1.0 to 2.6 million tons per year, with a best estimate of 1.45 million tons
per year.37 This estimate is somewhat lower than that of ten years
earlier, when the same organization estimated that marine transportation contributed 2.13 million metric tonnes (the equivalent of
approximately 2.35 million non-metric tons) of petroleum hydrocarbons

34 12 May 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900,327 U.N.T.S. 3.
35 For a discussion of the international legal regime, see R.M. M'Gonigle & M.W. Zacher,
Pollution, Politics,and InternationalLaw: Tankers at Sea (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1979).
36 See Gourlay, supra,note 13 at 85 and D.W. Abecassis et aL, Oil Pollutionfrom Ships, 2d ed.
by D.W. Abecassis (London: Stevens & Sons, 1985) at para. 4-05--4-09.

37 Oil in the Sea, supra,note 33 at 56.
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to the oceans each year.38 This reduction may reflect the at least partial
efficacy of the international control measures implemented in the
intervening years.
Tanker operational discharges account for approximately half of
this total 39 The vast majority of these discharges, amounting to 672,000
tons per year, is comprised of crude oil from crude oil tankers. A much
smaller portion, approximately 37,000 tons per year, is comprised of
product oil, including lubricating oil, fuel oil, kerosene, and gasoline. 40
Most of these discharges occur during "long haul" voyages. 41 The
National Academy of Science further estimates that, of the total amount
of oil discharged annually from marine transportation activities, 400,000
tons per year, or 27.6 per cent of all vessel source pollution, are due to
accidental spills. 42 These spills are mainly from tankers.
Canada has had its fair share of oil spills. There were twenty-five
major fuel spills from either tankers or bulk carriers in Canada from
1972-1987, ranging in size from 129 to 7,139 tons, with an average of 669
tons. The majority occurred on the East Coast, with the most frequent
causes being groundings and bad weather.43 The most notorious of
these occurred in February 1970, when the Arrow grounded off Nova
Scotia, spilling 10,000 tons of heavy crude (Bunker C) oil into the waters
of Chedabucto Bay. Another major incident was the breakup of the s.s.
Kurdistan in 1979.44
In British Columbia, between 1984 and 1989, there have been a
total of thirty-seven "significant" spills on the West Coast, including the

38

National Academy of Sciences, Petroleum in the Marine Environment: Workshop on Inputs,

Facts, and the Effects of Petroleum in the Marine Environment (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy of Sciences, 1975) at 6, cited in M'Gonigle & Zacher,supra, note 35 at 17 (Table 2).
39

J.A. Cowley, "IMO and National Administrations" (1989) 11MO News 14 at 14.

40

Oil in the Sea, supra, note 33 at 60-63.

41

Ibid at 60.

42 Ibid. at 56.
43 Computer printout showing spills from bulk carriers or tankers in Canadian waters from
1972 to 1987 (NATES Data Base, Environmental Emergencies Centre, Environment Canada,
Ottawa, 1989) [unpublished].
44 The Kurdistan discharged 7,130 tonnes of Bunker
C fuel into Cabot Strait, Nova Scotia on 3
March 1979. The spill was allegedly due to a major tank leak caused by a "material failure." Ibid.
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Exxon Valdez and Nestucca spills. 45 Based on current tanker traffic
levels, the Public Review Panel estimates that "unless the situation
changes, Canada will experience over 100 small spills, about 10
moderate spills and at least one major spill every year." 46
2. The environmental effects of oil in water
Although there exists a wide divergence of opinion on the fate
and long term effects of oil on the marine environment, ship source oil
pollution is obviously seriously detrimental to the marine environment.
Coastlines and vulnerable habitat are often eradicated over a broad
area. Even where they are recolonized over time, habitats may not
return to their pre-spill character or level of productivity for decades, if
ever. Seabirds typically die in the thousands following a major oil spill,
when their feathers become oiled and lose the ability to retain heat. Fur
bearing marine mammals, such as sea otters, suffer the same fate. As
well, inhaling oil fumes damages the lungs of mammals, and ingesting oil
severely damages their kidneys and livers. In Alaska, local sea otter
populations have been reduced by as much as one-third to one-half
following oil contamination from the Exxon Valdez.4 7 Even land
mammals, including bears, eagles, and other carrion feeders, are harmed
by the consumption of oiled carcasses. The combined effect of habitat
and population loss is a crippling environmental blow.
The effects of oil on fish populations range from death to sublethal effects, which include reduced growth, developmental abnormalities, behavioural changes, and altered or reduced reproductive
potential. 48 Fish larvae and eggs are extremely sensitive to oil pollution
and may be killed in concentrations as low as 0.1 to 1 parts per million
(ppm). Bivalves, such as clams and oysters, may be killed in concen45 Computer record entitled Significant West Coast Spills to Marine Waters from Marine
Vessels: 1984-1989 (Environment Canada, Vancouver, 1989) [unpublished].
46

ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 8. The Panel defines "small spills as less than 1
spills from 1 to 100 tonnes, major spills from 100 to 10 000 tonnes and catastrophic
moderate
tonne,
spills as greater than 10 000 tonnes." Ibid. at 7.
47

Anderson, supra,note 7 at 66.

48 West Coast Offshore Exploration EnvironmentalAssessment Pane Offshore Hydrocarbon
Exploration: Report (Vancouver: Ministry of Supply & Services, April 1986) at 63 [hereinafter

Offshore HydrocarbonExploration].
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trations of 1 to 10 ppm or less, depending on their stage of development.49 They may remain contaminated for up to one year following
exposure to oil, possibly longer.50
There is evidence that oil can even induce cancer in marine
organisms and in the humans that consume them.51 Some petroleum
hydrocarbon compounds may become toxic, mutagenic, or carcinogenic,
with the ability to bind the nucleic acids,52 and certain potentially
carcinogenic components of crude oil are known to bioaccumulate in the
fatty, nervous, and cutaneous tissues of marine animals.53 Yet, great
uncertainty still exists concerning the long term effects of oil once it
enters the food chain. As the National Research Council in the United
States notes, "Little is known of either the distribution, fate, or turnover
of the metabolic products of petroleum hydrocarbons, after their
formation within the tissues of marine organisms. ''5 4 Still less is known
as to how serious or reversible are the cumulative effects over time of
chronic oil pollution from operational discharges, combined with
decades of industrial contamination from land based pollution sources.
3. The social effects of oil in water
The social impacts of oil pollution may also be substantial. For
people who live and work in a coastal marine environment, the effects of
49

p.Nounou, "The Oil Spill Age: Fate and Effects of Oil in the Marine Environment" (1980)
9:6 Ambio 297 at 299-300.
SO Offshore HydrocarbonExploration,supra, note 48.
51

Nounou,supra, note 49 at 300.

52 Oil in the Sea, supra,note 33 at 15.
5

3 Nounou, supra, note 49 at 300.

54 Oil in the Sea, supra, note 33 at 389. Nounou, supra, note 49 at 299 concludes that much of
this paucity of data is simply due to poor methodology:
The plethora of attempts to determine the toxic potential of petroleum and petroleum
products to marine life have produced confusing and often erroneous conclusions. In the case

of many laboratory experiments, this has mainly been due to the lack of standardized
techniques with respect to the type of oil, test organisms, or duration of exposure which
introduced errors in the interpretation of reported effects. Bioassays have often been
performed in laboratories under conditions which do not simulate natural conditions. Rarely
has the exact amount of oil initially added to aquaria been controlled; thus researchers have
overestimated the concentration causing visible effects, or underestimated those actually
effective.
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a major oil spill can be economically, culturally, and psychologically
devastating. The most economically tangible effects of a spill are clearly
demonstrated in the fishing and tourism industries. Following even the
relatively minor Nestucca incident, oyster and crab fisheries were closed
almost immediately in the Tofino and Uclulet regions of Vancouver
Island.55 Seafood markets themselves can be affected over a longer term
as customers avoid products from affected regions due to concerns
about health or to unpleasant flavours. Tourism can suffer in coastal
resort areas following a major spill, depending upon the level of visible
contamination along local beaches. As well, Native subsistence fishing
and gathering activities may be adversely affected and traditional lifestyles severely diminished.
Related to these direct costs, but less easily quantified, is the psychological impact on coastal communities. The decimation of wildlife
and pristine coastlines can be devastating to local residents. In Valdez,
the social and emotional upheaval caused by the spill has been
significant, manifesting in a number of ways. The "artificial economy"
created by the massive influx of clean-up workers and damage control
experts, combined with high paychecks for local residents employed in
clean-up crews, has had a severe negative impact on the community.
The corresponding surge of cash, the emotional impact of the spill, and
the disruption of the local economy have resulted in severe social
stresses. These are reflected in escalating alcoholism, family violence,
marital breakups, psychological disorders, and overcrowded local jails.56

55

Environment Canada, "Spills Management: Cleanup and Control" (1989) 9:1 Environment
Update 5 at 9. See also R. Howard, "B.C.'s Oil Spill Aftermath" The Globe and Mail (2 September
1989) D2.
56 For a brief discussion of the socio-economic impacts of oil pollution with respect to the
Exron Valdez spill, see National Response Team, The Exxon Valdez Oil Spil" A Report to the
President (Washington, D.C.: United States Environmental Protection Agency, 1989) (Samual K.
Skinner, Secretary, Department of Transportation, and William K. Reilly, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency) at 31-33.
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III. THE STATE OF THE LAW: PREVENTING POLLUTION
A. A BriefHistory ofRegulation
The past two decades have witnessed a number of high profile
landmark oil spill disasters throughout the world. In what has become a
predictable pattern of crisis management, the legal regime (whether
domestic or international) receives big promises which are translated
through legislation into incremental improvements in the year or two
following a crisis, then slips (especially in enforcement) as the attention
fades in later years.
The first and most dramatic of these incidents occurred on 18
March 1967, when the Torrey Canyon ran aground off the coast of
Cornwall, spilling 117,000 tonnes of Kuwaiti oil and fouling over a
hundred miles of British and French shorelines. Gaining extensive
worldwide media coverage, the spill was at that time one of the worst
environmental disasters in modern history.5 7 It also highlighted severe
deficiencies in international maritime law, particularly regarding the
right of a coastal state to intervene in the event of a spill and the
subsequent right of such a state to be fully compensated for any damage
incurred.5 8 The event prompted a number of significant reforms to the
international legislative regime. These included two private oil industry
initiatives to provide for compensation in the event of an accident and
three international conventions concerning coastal state intervention,
shipowner liability, and international compensation. In Canada, the
major legislative instrument of relevance in this field, the Canada
Shipping Act,5 9 was also substantially amended especially following the
Arrow incident, which occurred just three years after the sinking of the
Torrey Canyon.
In the mid-1970s, numerous other international conventions
were drafted or amended in the areas of accident prevention, safety, and
57 See E. Cowan, Oil and Water. The Torrey Canyon Disaster(Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968).
58 At the time, admiralty law dictated that, in order for the shipowner to exercise his or her
right of salvage, a certain period of time had to pass before any other party could legally intervene
in the event of a shipping accident. Accordingly, response to the spill was delayed for several days,
by which time its containment was virtually impossible. See also M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra, note
35 at 145.
59

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-9, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 6.
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the control of operational pollution. In 1976, the Argo Merchant,
carrying 27,000 tons of oil, sank off the coast of Massachusetts, another
crisis which marked the beginning of a new series of tanker accidents,
many of which took place in American waters. On 17 March 1977, the
Carter administration announced a series of significantly strengthened
legal and regulatory controls, the so-called "Carter Initiatives," which
represented, in part, a threat to act unilaterally in setting standards. This
prompted another flurry of international negotiations aimed at
improving and expanding the regulatory regime for both intentional and
accidental pollution. This activity was given another push when, in 1978,
the Amoco Cadiz ran aground off the coast of Brittany, spilling about
233,000 tons of crude oil onto the beaches, some of which had been
contaminated just over ten years earlier by the Torrey Canyon.
The international negotiations which occurred in that decade
laid the basis for the entire modern framework for oil pollution
regulation, both internationally and in Canada. There are three major
thrusts in the legal regulatory regime aimed at oil pollution prevention.
One focuses on direct prevention by means of standards for vessel
design, navigation, crew training, and crew certification. A second thrust
addresses the implementation and enforcement of the standards, an
important area as the level of political will and commitment of resources
to put new laws into practice ultimately determines that law's actual
effectiveness. A third focuses on liability and compensation when accidents do occur.
These three areas will be discussed in light of Canadian,
international, and certain u.s. legislation as it may affect Canada. Again,
the Canadian West Coast provides an exemplary focus of implementation in one area where the threat of a major oil spill is high. Canada is,
of course, party to a number of international maritime conventions
which will be discussed below. In general, most Canadian standards are
in accordance with international standards. 60

60

Interim Report of the Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response
Capability (29 September 1989) (Chair: D. Brander-Smith) at 17 [hereinafter Interim Report].
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B. Setting Ship Standards
1. The international context
The issue of oil pollution has long been one of international
concern. The debate has involved numerous actors, but for the past few
decades has found its major focus within the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), formerly known as the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO). 61 The IMO was created in 1948 as a
special agency within the United Nations at a time when there was a
perceived need for a permanent intergovernmental organization to
address the needs of the shipping community. Ten years later, in 1958,
the requisite twenty-one states ratified the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization,62 and the organization
formally came into being.63 Since then, prevention of oil pollution
through the regulation of shipping standards has been a central focus of
the IMO through the negotiation and administration of several
conventions.
a) Operationalpollution
The 1954 InternationalConventionfor the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea By Oil64 was the first such treaty. Though the Convention was
drafted prior to the formal ratification of the IMCO Convention, its administrative powers were quickly conferred upon the international body.
The 1954 Convention was the first large scale international environmental negotiation to be held in almost three decades. 65 Thirty-two
states attended, representing 95 per cent of the world's shipping
61 The name of the IMCO was changed in 1975 by an amendment to the Convention on the
InternationalMaritime Organization, 14 November 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 10374 (effective 22 March

1982).
62 6 March 1948,9 U.S.T. 621,289 U.N.T.S. 48.
63

M'Gonigle and Zacher, supra, note 35 at 39.

64

Supra, note 34.

65 M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra, note 35 at 219. Four years later, in 1958, the first Law of the
Sea Convention was concluded, a convention which was far less directly concerned with the
environment than were its successors.
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tonnage. Its product was a convention which was almost exclusively
concerned with operational discharges and which provided virtually no
means of ensuring compliance. A series of subsequent amendments in
1962 and 1969 similarly focused on operational discharges, with few

provisions in the way of monitoring and enforcement. 66 It was not until

1971 that amendments were agreed upon to address accidental
67
discharges.
By 1973, it was recognized that the current system of oil
pollution regulation was so deficient as to be virtually useless. Neither
the 1969 nor the 1971 amendments were yet in force. 68 The 1954
Convention, as amended in 1962, represented the sole international
regulatory scheme in existence at the time-and it was demonstrably
ineffectual. In practical terms, "self-reporting" of operational discharges
did not exist, and "few-if any-ships over 20,000 dwt were actually
complying with its 'general prohibition' provisions." 69
Thus, prompted largely by the environmental initiatives of the
Nixon administration, the 1973 InternationalConvention for the Prevention of PollutionFrom Ships,70 better known as mARPoL 73, was drafted.

In many ways,

MARPoL 73

consolidated and expanded the 1954

Convention. Its purpose was to seek "the achievement by 1975 if
possible but certainly by the end of the decade of the complete
66

See the 1962 Amendments, 11 April 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S.
332 and the 1969 Amendments, 21 October 1969, 28 U.S.T. 1205, T.I.A.S. No. 8505, U.K.T.S. 21
(1978), Cmnd 7094, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1.
67 See the 1971 (Tanks) Amendments, 15 October 1971, Misc. 36 (1972), Cmnd 5071,
reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 267. At the 1971 negotiations, such technical issues as crew standards,
navigational aids, traffic control, traffic separation schemes were discussed. The key provision
emerging from the conference was the establishment of limits on cargo tank sizes. For tankers
exceeding 400,000 dwt, cargo tanks were allowed a certain amount of proportional increase, while
still attempting to minimize the total "hypothetical outflow."
68 The 1969 Amendments did not enter into force until 20 January 1978. See International
Maritime Organization, Status of MultilateralConventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the
International Maritime Organizationor its Secretary-GeneralPerforms Depositary or Other Functions
(London: International Maritime Organization, 1989) at 418 [hereinafter Status of Multilateral
Conventions]. The 1971 (Tanks) Amendments never did enter into force, as they both lacked the
requisite number of contracting parties (only twenty-seven acceptances were deposited, while fortyseven were needed), and they were superseded by subsequent legislation. ]bid. at 422.
69

M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra,note 35 at 112.

70 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 2 November 1973,
reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOL 73].
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elimination of the wilful and intentional pollution of the seas by oil and
noxious substances other than oil, and the minimization of accidental
spills."71 Today, it is the foundation of international conventional law
and thus the standard for domestic law throughout the world.
M4RPOL 73 offered a dramatic improvement to, and expansion of,
its 1954 predecessor. In addition to dealing with oil discharges, it
provided for the control of other noxious substances. It did this by a
series of annexes, only the first of which dealt with oil. 72
Annex I contained a number of important provisions regulating
intentional discharges. The maximum discharge of oil for all new
tankers was reduced by half, from 1/15,000 to 1/30,000 of their total
cargo capacity.7 3 "Special areas" were created, in which, to all intents
and purposes, operational discharges would be totally prohibited.7 4
Another provision included an expansion of the definition of "oil" to
include not just "black oils," such as crude, but also refined or "white
oils." 75
In addition to the regulatory provisions regarding discharges,
certain ship and shore technologies were required under MARPOL 73,
71

Acceleration of the Maritime Safety Committee's Work Programme, Res. A.237 (VII), IMO

Assembly 7th Sess., Doc. IMO-047E (1971) at 156.

72 Annexes I to V deal with oil pollution, noxious liquid substances carried in bulk, harmful
substances carried in packaged forms, sewage, and garbage respectively. Annex I, concerned with
oil pollution, entered into force on 2 December 1983. Annex II is concerned with noxious liquid

substances, which are grouped into categories A (being the most toxic) to D, and to which differing

discharge criteria apply. Annex II was slated for entry into force on 2 October 1986. However,

additional amendments in 1985 were first required in order to resolve difficulties with technicalities
and implementation.

Annex II subsequently entered into force on 6 April 1987.

Annex III

concerns pollution caused by harmful substances carried in packaged form. It requires that such

packages are appropriately documented and receive a "Marine Pollutant" mark. This Annex is

"optional" and has not yet entered into force. Annex IV deals with sewage, prohibiting the

discharge of untreated sewage within four miles of the nearest body of land. Sewage must be
disinfected and pulverized between less than four and twelve miles before being discharged. Annex
IV is also optional and is not yet in force. Finally, Annex V concerns garbage. The discharge of

plastics into the marine environment is totally prohibited, 'and discharge restrictions are placed
upon ships in coastal waters and designated "Special Areas," such as the Baltic, Black, and
Mediterranean Seas. Annex V entered into force on 31 December 1988. See "Preventing Marine
Pollution," supra, note 16 at 4-7.
73

MARPOL 73, supra, note 70, Annex I, r. 9(1).

74 These included the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, the Red Sea, and the
"Gulfs Area." ]bid r. 10(1)(a)-(e).
75 Ibr. 1(1).
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without which discharge regulations were largely ineffectual. On shore,
reception facilities were mandated to ensure that stored oily wastes
would have somewhere to go. 76 Most significant of the shipboard
technologies was the requirement for all new tankers over 70,000 dwt to
contain segregated ballast tanks. 77 This was a major improvement, but it
was achieved at a price. In the negotiations, it replaced a more controversial proposal advocated by the u.s. to make double hulls mandatory
on all tankers over 70,000 dwt. Canada was among the states who
opposed the proposal.
The provisions of MARPOL 73 amounted to a serious attempt to
redesign new tankers (and alter some aspects of existing tankers) to be
environmentally self-contained. To achieve this, several other ship technologies were required, including slop tanks, 78 oil discharge monitoring
and control systems, filtering systems, oil/water interface detectors, and
special piping and pumping arrangements. 79 Oily water separators, or a
filtration system for discharges from machinery space bilges, as well as
on board storage tanks for oily residues were required of all ships
exceeding 400 gross tons. 80
To monitor for compliance of standards within their own waters,
"International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificates" were to be issued
to all oil tankers of 150 gross tons and more and to all other vessels of
81
400 tons and more for presentation to the port (that is, coastal) state.
2
The certificates remained valid for no more than five yearsP As well,
oil record books still had to be maintained, in which all operations
regarding the handling of oil were to be recorded. 83

76Ibid. r. 10 and 12.
77

1bid r. 13.

78 Oily ballast water and tank cleaning residues are stored in so-called "slop tanks" aboard the
tankers. In the "Load on Top" (LOT) system, oil rises to the top of the oily water mixture retained
in the slop tank and the relatively oil free water is then decanted from the bottom.
79

MARPOL 73, supra,note 70, r. 14-18.

80

Ibid. r. 16 and 17.

81

Ibid. r. 5.

82 Ibid r. 8.
83

Ibid. r. 20.
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However, by 1976, the 1969 amendments still remained the only
international regulations in force.8 4 As well, despite the great progress
made in 1973, the new regime still focussed on standards to control
operational pollution, not to prevent accidental pollution. In 1976, the
Argo Merchant incident and other spills in American waters prompted
the u.s. to threaten unilateral action (the "Carter Initiatives") if the international community failed to implement quickly, and even improve, the
new regimefls In this context, IMCO convened yet another conference,
the Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention (Tspp) in
1978. The main purpose of the TsPP was to correct deficiencies in
AmRPOL 73, as well as those in another new convention, the 1974 Safety of
Life at Sea Conference (SOL4S 74).86 The conference resulted in the
adoption of protocols to both SoLAs 74 and MARPOL 73 (thereafter known

as MARPOL 73/78).87 The MARPOL amendments created a number of improvements in terms of both ship design and powers of inspection that,
in essence, represent the state of international law today.88
The most notable amendment concerned the requirement for

segregated ballast tanks. Again, the United States demanded the adoption of a requirement for double hulls, something which was possible
under American law. 89 Instead, however, the 1973 standard was set to
require protectively located segregated ballast tanks (PuSBT) for all new
crude carriers of 20,000 dwt and over and for all new product carriers of
84 In fact, MARPOL 73 never entered into force, as it was superseded by MARPOL 73/78. See
infra, note 87. See also Status ofMultilateralConventions,supra, note 68 at 465.
85 The so-called "Carter Initiatives" consisted of a number of specific proposals to improve
tanker safety. These included provisions such as mandatory collision avoidance aids, inert gas
systems to prevent explosions, improved steering standards, and double bottoms on all tankers over
20,000 dwt, as well as improvements to enforcement, rules for liability, and crew certification.
86
InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, U.K-T.S 46 (1980),
Cmnd 7874, T.I.A.S. No. 9700, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 959 [hereinafter SOLAS 74].
87
Protocol Relating to the 1974 InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 16
February 1978, U.K.T.S 40 (1981), Cmnd 8277, T.I.A.S. No. 10009, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 579
[hereinafter SOLAS 74178] and ProtocolRelating to the 1973 International Convention for the
Prevention of PollutionFrom Ships, 17 February 1978, Misc. 26 (1974), Cmnd 5748, reprinted in 17
I.LM.546 [hereinafter MARPOL 73/78].
88
MALPOL has since been amended in 1984, 1985, 1987, and 1989. See infra, note 93 and
accompanying text.
89
Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1221 et seq. (Law. Co-op. 1987)
enabled the Coast Guard to require ship standards, such as double bottoms, higher than those
accepted internationally.
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30,000 dwt and over.90 Although a substantial compromise, this
provision certainly provides increased protection to the marine environment in the event of collisions or groundings. In addition, to reduce the
chances of explosions from vapour buildup, inert gas systems were
mandated for all new product carriers over 30,000 dwt and for all new
crude oil carriers over 20,000 dwt (MARPoL 73 required this only for crude
carriers exceeding 70,000 dwt).91 Finally, Crude Oil Washing (cow), a
much improved technique for cleaning dirty tanks, was required. 92
There have since been several amendments to MARPOL 73/78,
particularly important are the amendments in 1984. 93 Briefly, the 1984
Annex I amendments offer slightly strengthened environmental regulations and help resolve difficulties with implementing the Annex. For
example, further requirements for equipment and procedures in order to
prevent oily water from being discharged into "special areas" are
introduced. 94 In certain circumstances, the carriage of ballast water in
cargo tanks is permitted, 95 while the use of the forepeak tank to carly oil
is prohibited altogether. 96
For ships operating within fifty miles of land or on short voyages,
requirements for slop tanks and certain other monitoring and discharge
97
equipment may be waived, provided other conditions are met.
Similarly, for ships operating within twelve miles of land on "restricted"
voyages or within "special areas," requirements for equipment, such as
oily water separators and oily discharge monitoring equipment, are

90 MARPOL 73/78, supra, note 87, Annex I, r. 13(1).

91 b&d r. 13B(3).
92

ThN& r. 13. COW is a tank cleaning system, designed by the oil industry, where crude oil is
used to wash out cargo tanks. It is estimated that the technique removes 80 to 90 per cent of sludge
and oil residues. COW was required, not only of new tankers, but of all existing crude (unless these
implemented protectively located, segregated ballast tanks) and product carriers exceeding 40,000

dwt.
93 The 1984 Amendments to the Annex to the 1978 Protocol, September 1984, adopted by
resolution MEPC 14(20), effective 7 January 1986. SeeAdoption ofAmendments to the Annex of the

Protocolof 1978 Relating to the InternationalConvention for the Prevention ofPollutionfrom Ships,
1973, Res. MEPC 14(20), MEPC 20th Sess., Doc. MEPC 20/19, Annex 4 (1984).
94

Ibid. Annex I, r. 10.

95

Ibid. r. 13.
Ibid. r. 14.

96
97

bid. r. 15.
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waived, provided certain other conditions are met.98 Some discharges of
oil are permitted to occur below the waterline, provided that the water
and oil have been adequately separated.99 Some changes have been
made to the oil record book.100 The 1984 amendments entered into
force on 7 January 1986.101
Following the revisions to Annex I, further amendments to
MARPOL 73/78 were undertaken in 1985.P2 The 1985 amendments deal
with modifications to Annex II, which are primarily beyond the scope of
this review.103 It is worth noting, however, that the 1985 amendments
made the InternationalBulk Chemical Code104 mandatory from 6 April
1987, the date upon which the 1985 amendments entered into force 105
In 1987, a further amendment to Annex I resulted in designating the
Gulf of Aden a "special area" under regulation 10.106
MARPOL 73/78 remains the key international instrument responsible
for regulating the transportation of oil by sea. This is particularly true of
vessel design standards. Canada had no small part to play in the development of the landmark Convention and its Protocol. Indeed, led by then
Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, William O'Neill, Canada
took an active leadership role at the rsPP conference in 1978.107 O'Neill
has continued to play an active role at the IMO throughout the 1980s and,
98

Ibid. r. 16.

99 Ibid. r. 18.
100 bmid. r. 20.
101 Status ofMultilateralConventions, supra,note 68 at 101.
102 The 1985 amendments to the Protocol of 1978 relating to the InternationalConvention for
the Preventionof Pollutionfrom Ships, 1973, adopted by resolution MEPC 21(22), effective 6 April
1987. Ibid. at 103.
103 For more information, see International Maritime Organization, "MARPOL 73178" Focus
on IMO (March 1988) at 14-16. Annex II was further amended in March 1989, by MEPC
Resolution 36(28), effective 13 October 1990.

104 InternationalBulk Chemical Code,
105 See "MARPOL 73/78," supra, note 103.

106 Ibid. at 16.
107 As a number of factions developed regarding alternatives to double hulls, namely, PL/SBT

in conjunction with special tank washing requirements, Mr. O'Neill worked closely with the other
delegates to facilitate the discussions. In recognition of his constructive mediatory skills, Mr.
O'Neill was asked to present the final compromise package for acceptance. The TSPP negotiations
are discussed in M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra, note 35 at 122-42.

1992]

A Black (AndRising?) Tide

in 1989, was appointed the organization's new Secretary-General.108
MARPOL 73/78 entered into force on 2 October 1983.10 9 There are now fiftyfive contracting states, including the u.s.110 Remarkably, however,
Canada has not ratified MARPOL 73/78.
b) Accidentalpollution
International regulations dealing with shipping standards to
prevent accidents are applicable generally and are not restricted to the
transportation of oil. The most important of these are the 1972
Convention on the InternationalRegulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea (COLREG 72), 111 the 1974 InternationalConventionfor the Safety of Life
at Sea (soLAs 74), 112 and the 1978 InternationalConvention on Standards
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (sTcw),1 13 plus
the many amendments to these conventions. soLs and COLREG and their
subsequent amendments "have received such widespread ratification
that ...
their fundamental principles must be considered to have passed
'114
into customary international law."
i) Preventing Collisions
International regulation to prevent collisions and maintain ship
safety long predates the iMO. In the early years of this century, international collision regulations were attached to other regulations
applying more generally to safety of life at sea. When these latter regu-

108 International Maritime Organization, "Mr. O'Neill of Canada Takes Over as IMO
Secretary-General" (1990) 1 IMO News at 1.
109 Status of MultilateralConventions, supra,note 68 at 69.
110 The United States ratified the Convention on 12 August 1980, with a reservation stating
"that the United States considers that Annex I and II of the Protocol apply only to seagoing ships."
See Status ofMultilateralConventions, ibidL
at 100.
ill 20 October 1972, U.K.T.S. 77 (1977), Cmnd 6962, T.I.A.S. No. 8587, Can. T.S. 45 1977
[hereinafter COLREG 72].
112

Supra, note 86.
113 7 July 1978, Misc. 6 (1979), Cmnd 7543, Can. T.S. 36 1988 [hereinafter STCWI.
114

Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36 at para. 4-27.
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lations were superseded by the 1960 soLAs Convention,115 the collision
regulations were separated out and incorporated instead into the 1960
InternationalRegulationsfor Preventing Collisions at Sea. These were
revised and incorporated by IMCO into COLREG 72, which has subsequently

been amended a number of times. 116
COLREG 72 sets out basic standards for navigation and safety
through a variety of provisions concerning such aspects of collision
avoidance as vessel speed,'117 radar, conduct in restricted visibility,"18
navigational lights and shapes, 119 distress signals, 120 the marking of
fishing gear,121 proper lookout procedures, 22 and'signals for dredging or
underwater operations. 23 Most importantly, COLREG 72 contains over
sixty vessel traffic routing schemes. All traffic separation schemes
adopted by iMo are mandatory. 24

115 InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, signed 17 June 1960, reprinted in 536
U.N.T.S. 27.
116
The 1981 amendments to COLREG 72 (IMO Assembly resolution A.464(XII), effective 1
June 1983) exempt certain vessels with restricted manoeverability from the provisions of rule 10
(concerning mandatory traffic separation schemes), when they are engaged in cable laying or
operations aimed at improving navigation safety. See International Maritime Organization, "IMO
and the Safety of Navigation" Focus on IMO (February 1990) at 4. The 1987 amendments
(Amendments to the InternationalRegulationsfor PreventingCollisionsat Sea, 1972, Res. A.626(15),
IMO Assembly 15th Sess., Doc. IMO-130E (1987) at 137) stressed that the provisions of rule 10
apply to IMO-designated traffic separation schemes, but do not exempt vessels from any other legal
obligations. As well, the amendments clarify the means by which vessels should cross traffic lanes.
Finally, the 1989 amendment permits the use of inshore traffic lanes by fishing vessels. See "On the
Horizon" (1990) 4 IMO News 4.
117COLREG 72, supra, note 111, r. 6.
118Ibid. r. 19.
119Ibid. r. 20-31.
120 bid.Annexes -IV.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid. r. 5.
123 The regulations are comprised of 38 rules divided into 5 parts. Part A deals with
definitions, the general application of the rules, and general obligations for their application. Part B
concerns steering and sailing. Part C concerns required lights and shapes. Part D deals with sound
and light signals. Part E covers exemptions. See "IMO and the Safety of Navigation," supra, note
116 at 2-4.
124 COLREG 72, supra, note 111, r. 10.
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ii) Maintaining Safety at Sea
Like the international collision regulations, the many international provisions relating to safety are, by their nature, relevant to
pollution prevention. The roots of soLis extend long before the formation of Iwo. In the historic pattern of high profile disaster followed by
regulatory action, the first soLAs was drafted in 1914, following the
sinking of the Titanic.125 The Convention was again amended in 1929
and in 1948.126 However, two years after its official birth, IMCO drafted
soLAs 6o, superseding its 1948 predecessor.12 7 Fourteen years later, the
agreement was again superseded by SOLAS 74.128 Like MARPOL 78, a
protocol to soias 74 (soLAs 74/78) was negotiated at the TsPP conference in
1978 and has been amended several times, including a second protocol
in 1988.129
SOLAS 74/78 deals with such marine safety issues as structural
requirements for ships, fire protection, mandatory lifesaving equipment,
radio-communications, safety of navigation, the carriage of grain and
dangerous goods, and nuclear vessels.
The establishment of standards for steering gear has long been a
particularly important safety issue. The potential for pollution damage
resulting from steering failure was vividly highlighted by the Amoco
Cadiz incident in 1978,130 and a series of regulations in 1978 and 1981
required special steering gear provisions for tankers, including main and

125

Reprinted in 108 Br. and For. St. Papers 283.

126 1929 InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 31 May 1929, 136 L.T.S. 81 and
1948 InternationalConventionfor the Safety of Life at Sea, 10 June 1948,16 U.N.T.S. 203.
12 7
SOLAS 1948 was superseded by SOLAS 60, taking effect from 26 May 1965. See Status of
MultilateralConventions, supra, note 68 at 391.
128

Ibid. at 9.

129 ProtocolRelating to the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 11
November 1988, IMO Doc. HSSC/CONF/11 (not yet in force).
130 Although the Amoco Cadiz was built according to standards of the American Shipping
Bureau, the steering gear failed when the ship encountered a heavy storm off the coast of Brittany.
Attempts to repair the steering gear failed, as did attempts to tow the massive vessel out to sea (the

tow line broke twice). The vessel grounded. Several hours later, she broke in two, spilling her
entire cargo of crude oil out onto the French Coast. See C. Juric, "A Review of the Liability Issues
Arising from the Grounding of the Oil Tanker, Amoco Cadiz" in J. Kennely, ed., Trial Lawyer's
Guide (Deerfield, Ill.: Callaghan & Co., 1987) 297 at 300-1.
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auxiliary steering gear for all ships, with two or more power unit backups
for all tankers of 10,000 tons gross tonnage (tgt) and over.131
soLAs 74/78 also sets out several requirements for navigational
aids. Radar was first made mandatory by soL~s 74, which also required
that all ships of at least 1,600 tgt maintain a gyro-compass, echo-sounder,
radio-telephone, and distress frequency honing device.132 In addition,
the 1981 amendments to soLAs required all vessels of 10,000 tgt and over
to install such safety features as an automatic radar plotting aid, devices
to indicate speed and distance, radio direction-finders, and a rate-of-turn
indicator for new ships.133
The Convention also contains a number of provisions regarding
fire protection, detection, and extinction and the installation of inert gas
systems 34 soLAs included new towing requirements, again prompted
largely by theAmoco Cadiz spill, in which the tow line snapped. As well,
it provides for vessel design inspections, where authorized classification
societies such as Lloyd's Register of Shipping and the American Bureau
of Shipping issue a "Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate" and a
"Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate." Additional inspections are
permitted, but government surveyors should board and inspect vessels
only if they have "clear grounds" that such an inspection is warranted,
that is, that the vessel is substandard in some way. 35 SOLAS 74 entered
into force on 25 May 1980, two years after Canada acceded to the
Convention.1 36 There are 106 contracting states, representing 97 per
cent of gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping fleet. 137 The
131

SOLAS 74178, supra, note 87, c. II-1, r. 29, as am.

132

Ibd c. 1-2, r. 12.

133

Ibid.

134 Ibid. c. 11-2, as am. Regulation 60(1) requires inert gas systems (necessary for the
implementation of COW) on all tankers of 20,000 tonnes dwt, with transitional provisions for
existing tankers.
135
Ibu c. I, r. 6.
136 Canada acceded to SOLAS 74 on 8 May 1978. See Status of MultilateralConventions,
supra, note 68 at 9.
137 Ibid. at 18. There have been several amendments to the Protocol since 1978, the most
important for the purposes of oil tankers occurred in 1981 and 1983. All of these amendments have
entered into force. Ibid. at 9. For further information, see International Maritime Organization,
"SOLAS: The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974" Focus on IMO
(November 1989) 1.
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1978 Protocol to SOLAS entered into force on 1 May 1981.138 There are
seventy contracting states to the Protocol,the combined merchant fleets
of which represent approximately 90 per cent of the gross tonnage of the
world's merchant fleet. 139
iii) Establishing Crew Standards
Human error is by far the major cause of shipping accidents at
sea. Indeed, it has been estimated that up to 90 per cent of marine
casualties result from human error.1 40 Clearly, the human factor is
directly affected by the standards of training and certification of shipboard personnel. Prompted by the Carter Initiatives, the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certificationand Watchkeeping for Seafarers (sTcw)141 is the major IMO convention dealing with
minimum mandatory requirements in terms of age, training, and
experience for crew, masters, and officers. 142 The sTcw requires
seafarers to hold valid certificates and endorsement forms,143 although
requirements for crew on near coastal voyages may be less stringent.144
Crew training and standards must keep up with the growth of
tanker technology, but this is a constant struggle given the concern to cut
costs. In this light, there is a growing international trend towards hiring
crews from Third World countries. 145 Typically, while providing cheap
labour, such crews possess little education or training, problems which in
turn may be aggravated by communication barriers. It has been noted
138 Status of Multilateral Conventions, supra, note 68 at 31.

Unlike MARPOL, the 1978

Protocolto SOLAS 74 can be accepted separately.
139
Ibid. at 36.
140 ProtectingOur Waters,supra, note 4 at 25.
141

Supra, note 113.

142 These requirements are laid out primarily in chapter II. Ibd
143

The content of these is laid out in chapter I, regulation 2. lbid.

144 Ibid. c. I, r. 3.
145 Canada is an exception to this trend. Section 125(2) of the Canada ShippingAc supra,
note 59 provides that "No certificate shall be granted under this Part to an applicant therefor unless
he is a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident of Canada within the meaning of the Immigration

Act." This restriction, however, puts the Canadian fleet at a competitive disadvantage internationally, and there is repeated pressure from shipping companies to relax such restrictions.
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that, generally, "the most pressing threat to safe ship operation today, or
rather in the near future, will be the unavailability of trained officers and
crew." 146
Although the sTcw has attempted to confront this situation, it is
limited in its effect. For example, it stipulates the types of knowledge
required for officers and crew, but does not mandate procedures necessary to assure particular levels of knowledge. Indeed, the wording of the
Convention is quite general and leaves its interpretation and implementation almost entirely to the discretion of the flag state. 147
Consequently, shipboard standards vary considerably among states party
to the sTcw. The sTcw entered into force on 28 April 1984148 and has
seventy-seven contracting states, "the combined merchant fleets of which
constitute approximately 75% of the gross tonnage of the world's
merchant fleet." 149
2. The Canadian context
In Canada, the legislative framework dealing with ship source
pollution is largely contained within the Canada Shipping Act,150 the
Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAct,151 and the federal FisheriesAct. 152
Other statutes may apply in particular regions1 53 While the former two
146 "Training-or lack of it-major worry, LSM/SNI's conference was told" Lloyd's Ship
ManagerlShippingNews International(April 1989) 4 at 4.
147 For example, chapter V of the Annex to the STCW, supra, note 113, dealing with the
technical provisions of the Convention, is concerned with special requirements for tankers.
Regulation 1 states that officers and ratings working aboard oil tankers "shall have completed an
appropriateshore-based fire-fighting course; and (a) an appropriateperiod of supervised shipboard
service in order to acquire adequate knowledge of safe operational practices; or (b) an approved oil
tanker familiarization course which includes basic safety and pollution prevention precautions and
procedures." (Emphasis added).
148
Status ofMultilateralConventions,supra, note 68 at 337.
149

Ibid at 342.

15 0

Supra, note 59.
151 R.S.C. 1985, c. A-12.
152

pRS.C 1985, c. F-14.

153 Other relevant legislation includes: Western Arctic (Inuvialuit)Claims Settlement Act, S.C.
1984, c. 24 (incorporating the Inuvialuit Final Agreement); St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-2; Oil and Gas Productionand ConservationAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-4; and Canada
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Acts are administered by the Department of Transport, the latter Act is
administered by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The
CanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct,15 4 though not specifically regulating navigation and ship source pollution, could potentially apply in
certain cases.155 To date, however, regulations have been made solely
pursuant to the CanadaShipping Act.15 6 This paper will be restricted to
15 7
a consideration of the CanadaShippingAct.
The Act first came into force in 1906 and was drafted according
to its model, the 1894 British Merchant ShippingAct.158 Both Acts have
long been criticized as awkward by those responsible for implementing
them. As was noted in the Coast Guard's internal review, the Act is
"frequently out-of-date, confusing, uncoordinated and poorly structured": "There have been many piecemeal amendments to the CSA
since it came into force in 1906; however, the basic structure and
philosophies have remained unchanged."15 9
Despite taking an historically strong environmentalist approach
in IMCO and law of the sea arenas, 160 standards in the Act have lagged
behind those set internationally or under American law. The Arrow
incident vividly illustrated its deficiencies in 1970. At the time, there
existed no statutory framework for liability and compensation, no government contingency plan, no overall policy clarifying which federal
departments bore responsibility for such emergencies, and little equip-

PortsCorporationAct, R.S.C 1985, c. C-9.

154 S.C. 1988, c. 22.
155 See, especially, Parts II, IV, and VI. See also Internal Federal Review, "Gaps and

Overlaps: Final Paper" by Policy Team Group F (Ottawa:

Canadian Coast Guard, 1989)

[unpublished] [hereinafter "Gaps and Overlaps"].

1561bid
15 7

The other statutes are restricted geographically (Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct,
supra, note 151) or merely provide penalties for pollution, but do not set standards (FisheriesAct,
supra, note 152), or are simply not being utilized for this purpose (CanadianEnvironmental
ProtectionAct, supra, note 154).
158 (U.K.) 57 & 58 Vict., c. 60.
159 Federal Internal Review, "Federal Tanker Safety Review: Policy Issue Legislation and

Regulatory Process" (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) at 3 [unpublished].
160 See, for example, R.M. M'Gonigle & M.W. Zacher, "Canadian Foreign Policy and the

Control of Marine Pollution" in B. Johnson & M.W. Zacher, eds, CanadianForeign Policy and the
Law of the Sea (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977) 100.
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ment to clean up marine spills.161 The amendments contained in Part
XX of the Act came into force in 1972 after the Arrow disaster and
created for the first time a comprehensive legal regime regarding
pollution prevention and response capabilities.
Any momentum to updating and improving the legislation in the
area of standard setting to control ship source oil pollution stopped,
however, with the 1972 amendments. In spite of the hard lessons of the
Arrow and other international incidents over the years, key international
conventions, including MARPOL 73/78, were never ratified by Canada and
incorporated into theAct.
a) Operationalpollution
Operational discharges, according to the Public Review Panel,
routinely occurring with alarming frequency in and around our
coastal waters."1 62 In Canada, as elsewhere, operational spills are
reported to occur most often at terminals or ports, especially during the
course of such routine operations as the transferring, loading, and
unloading of cargo.1 63
The Oil PollutionPreventionRegulations16 4 made pursuant to the
CanadaShippingAct are concerned with both operational and accidental
discharges.165 For example, they provide for mandatory fitting of
containers or enclosed deck areas around points where oil cargo is
loaded, unloaded, or transferred.16 6 Slop tanks are required on all ships
of 400 tgt or more on ocean voyages and for all ships of 100 tgt or more
C'are

161 See Report of the Royal Commission: Pollution of Canadian Waters by Oil and Formal
Investigationinto Grounding of Steam TankerArrow (Ottawa: Information Canada, 12 March 1970)
(Commissioner: Gordon LS. Hart) [hereinafter Report of the Royal Commission].
162 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 35. The Panel cites several examples of a series of
such spills which occurred during the course of the cross-country hearings. Ibid. at 34.
163 Ibid. at 35. See also Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36 at para. 4-10 (Table 4.2).
164

C.R.C. 1978, c. 1454.
165 The regulations consist of five parts and are concerned with discharges in Canadian
territorial waters and fishing zones (Part I); waters beyond the territorial sea and fishing zones (Part
U); the handling of cargo, fuel, and ballast (Part III);
general provisions (Part IV); and limitations
on cargo tank size (Part V). Part III has been amended by SOR/80-281, SOR/85-181, and
SOR/87-231.
166
Oil PollutionPreventionRegulations,supra, note 164, s. 15.
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voyaging in inland or minor waters.167 Such ships are similarly required
to "have the means to discharge oily waste or oily bilge slops to a
reception facility." 168 Canadian tankers, beyond the territorial seas or
200 mile fishing zones, are permitted to discharge restricted quantities of
persistent oil or oily mixtures so long as certain conditions are met.169
As well, all Canadian ships of 150 tgt or more carrying oil as
cargo are required to keep oil record books.1 7° These must document
various operations undertaken, including loading, unloading, transferring, ballasting, and cleaning of cargo tanks, discharge of water ballast
from unclean tanks, discharge of water from slop tanks, disposal of oily
residues, debilging, and accidental discharges.1 7 Similar provisions also
apply to foreign ships in Canadian waters.172
The Oil PollutionPreventionRegulations thus largely concur with
the 1954 Convention as well as MARPOL 73, prior to the 1978 Protocol.
However, they do not require such important current M4RPOL provisions
as oily water separators, automatically controlled shut-off devices for
pumping systems, or oil content monitoring devices. Other provisions
under MARPOL 73178, such as Crude Oil Washing (cow) or dedicated clean
ballast tanks, are similarly not required.
Of particular importance is the fact that the Oil Pollution
Prevention Regulations mandate a "zero discharge" regime with respect
to operational spills or intentional discharges of any kind within Canadian waters, including the 200 mile Canadian Fishing Zones. 173 In this
respect, Canadian provisions are more stringent than those even of
167bid .s.
17(1).
168

Ibid. s. 18.

169 These conditions are as follows:
(a) the tanker is proceeding en route;

(b) the instantaneous rate of discharge of persistent oil content does not exceed 60 litres per
mile;
(c) the total quantity of persistent oil discharged on the voyage does not exceed one fifteen
thousandth of the total liquid cargo carrying capacity of the tankers; and
(d) the tanker is more than 50 miles from the nearest land.

mid. s. 11(1).
170Ibid. s. 29.
1 71

Ibid. s. 31(1)-(2) (a).

1 72

ibid. s. 30.

173 Ibid. s. 5. The regulations do not apply to waters contained within the shipping safety
control zones prescribed under the Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAc4 supra, note 151. bid. s. 4.
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However, as will be discussed later, enforcement of this
regime leaves much to be desired.
The Canada ShippingAct amendments only recently cleared the
way for the implementation of MARPOL. 1 74 Apparently, however, there
remain technical difficulties concerning the nature of the amendments to
the Oil PollutionPreventionRegulations which would be required to do
so.1 75 It is believed that Canada will accede to the MARPOL in the near
176
future.
MARPOL 73/78.

b) Accidentalpollution
It will be recalled that, to a large degree, standards for the
prevention of accidents (whether these be collision regulations, crew
standards, or requirements for the safety of life at sea) apply to a variety
of ships and not only to tankers. In this area, Canadian standards are
generally in accordance with those of international conventions.
i) Navigation and Safety
Canada ratified COLREG 72 on 7 March 1975, with the regulations
entering into force domestically on 15 July 1977 (the same time as they
entered into force in the United States). 177 COLREG 72 and its several
amendments are implemented verbatim, with Canadian modifications

174

Supra, note 59, s. 658.

175 Much of the technical difficulties in adopting Annex I of MA4RPOL rests with the wording
of the necessary amendments to the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations, supra, note 164. For
example, while the Coast Guard wished to adopt the MARPOL provisions verbatim, the Privy
Council Office objected to its sometimes imprecise wording. The issue has been resolved, so that
the Privy Council Office will now allow for the attachment of Annex I by reference to totally revised

Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations. Personal communication with Tom Fleck, Canadian Coast
Guard, Pollution Prevention Section (Ottawa, 8 November 1990).
176 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 81.
177 Status of MultilateralConventions, supra, note 68 at 50 and 53.
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added through the Canadian Collision Regulations,178 made pursuant to
the CanadaShippingAct.179
A sound and comprehensive navigational safety system which
can minimize the chance of a collision or grounding contains certain key
ingredients, including routing schemes, communication and management systems, pilotage requirements, navigational equipment and
technology, and hydrographic charting. The key to effective pollution
control is the practical implementation of legal requirements. We shall
briefly review here these more practical elements of the navigational
system in Canada.
Perhaps, the most important navigational provisions are those
concerned with routing. Designated tanker routes significantly reduce
collisions and can be designed to keep loaded tankers at a safe distance
from hazardous or environmentally sensitive areas. Rule 10 of COLAEG
72, which provides for the implementation of NMo-designated ships'
routing and traffic separation schemes, applies to the three mandatory
traffic separation schemes within Canada: Chedabucto Bay and the Bay
of Fundy on the East Coast and the Strait of Juan de Fuca on the West
Coast. By section 562.11(2), special "Canadian Modifications" are
applied to rule 10 of the Collision Regulations in Canadian waters to
make the use of such schemes mandatory, except for commercial fishing
in special operations, such as salvage, cable,
vessels or vessels engaged 180
buoy, or survey operations.

178 C.R.C. 1978, c. 1416. For example, under the 11 October 1990 amendments to the
Canadian regulations (SOR/90-702), paragraph (in) to rule 10 has been added, noting that various
Canadian provisions regarding traffic separation schemes will be noted in updated editions of Notice
to Mariners: I to 443, 1989 Annual Edition (Ottawa:

Ministry of Supply and Services, 1989)

[hereinafter Notice to Mariners].
179
According to section 562.11(1) of the CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59, regulations may
be made by the Governor in Council "to implement the convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, signed in London on October 20, 1972, as
amended in London on November 19, 1981, or to implement any amendments, whenever made, to
the Regulation to that Convention."
180 Canada's instrument of accession to COLREG in 1975 was accompanied by a declaration
which objected to the fact that "the provisions of rule 10, 'Traffic Separation Schemes,' do not
provide for compulsory use of the adopted schemes" and that "there are no exceptions to rule 10(b)
(c) and (h) for vessels engaged in fishing." See Status of MultilateralConventions, supra, note 68 at
57. The Governor in Council may restrict the application of the Collision Regulations of 1972
pursuant to section 562.11(3) of the CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59.

200
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Vessel Traffic Services (vTs), administered through the Canadian Coast Guard, provide a communication and management system
which is also crucial to navigational safety. The first VTS system was
developed for the St. Lawrence River in 1966,181 and there are now
eleven VTS zones throughout Canada.182 The vessel traffic services
provided in these zones include providing information and monitoring of
traffic movement, designating ships' routing or exclusion zones,
providing traffic separation lanes, maintaining standard communication
channels, and, perhaps most important, providing radar coverage of
coastal shipping lanes.
The importance of Vessel Traffic Services is recognized at the
international level as well. On 20 November 1985, the IMO Assembly
adopted the "IMO Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services." 183 However,
the ability to make regulations establishing national Vessel Traffic
Service zones was only recently included in the Canada Shipping Act,
with the major package of amendments passed by Parliament in 1985184
Prior to 1989, participation in vrs systems, such as those established at
Tofino, Prince Rupert, and Vancouver, was voluntary. 85 Participation
in designated VTs zones is now mandatory for vessels exceeding twenty
metres in length, as well as for large tugboats and barges, under the

181 Canadian Coast Guard, Western Region Vessel Traffic Services, A Guide to the VTS

Regulations (Information paper, Spring 1989) [unpublished].
182 These are located in St. John's, Newfoundland; Placentia Bay; Port aux Basques; Halifax

Harbour and Approaches; Bay of Fundy; St. Lawrence Waterway; Sarnia; Vancouver; Tofino; and
Prince Rupert. See Canadian Coast Guard (Aids and Waterways), "Notice 25-Vessel Traffic

Services" in Notice to Mariners,supra,note 178, 107 at para. 7.1
183
GuidelinesforVessel Traffic Services, Res. A.578(14), IMO Assembly 14th Sess., Doc. IMO120E (1985) at 114.. For further discussion, see also G. Plant, "International Legal Aspects of
Vessel Traffic Services" (1990) 14:1 Marine Policy 71.

184 As amended, section 562.15 enables the Governor in Council to make regulations
'concerning vessel traffic clearances. Section 562.16 now provides for regulations
(a) establishing Vessel Traffic Services Zones;

(b) respecting the monitoring and surveillance of marine traffic about to enter or within a
Vessel Traffic Services Zone;

(c) respecting the procedures and practices to be followed by ships about to enter or within a
Vessel Traffic Services Zone; and

(d) respecting the radio frequencies that ships about to enter or within a Vessel Traffic
Services Zone must be capable of using.

185 Personal Communication with Tom Brook, Navigation Safety, Canadian Coast Guard
(Ottawa, 30 January 1990).
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recently drafted Vessel Traffic Services Zones Regulations.18 6 At least
fifteen minutes prior to entering a VTS zone, ships are required to report
their name, radio call sign, position, estimated time of entry, destination,
and whether they are carrying any dangerous cargo or pollutants.18 7
Pursuant to section 562.18(1), no direction may be issued by the
Canadian Coast Guard Commissioner or a designated Marine Traffic
Controller which would contravene the COLmREGS, ship routing schemes,
VTS procedures, or regulations or by-laws made by the Canada Ports
Corporation. During an introductory phase, however, this provision is
not being enforced.1 88
In addition, three Vessel Traffic Reporting systems exist for the
coastal and offshore waters of Canada. These systems apply to vessels
entering Western Canadian waters and Eastern or Arctic waters which
are not within a local Vessel Traffic Services zone. Twenty-four hours in
advance of entering the twelve mile zone boundaries, participating
vessels report their position, speed, course, destination, any defects, and
any potentially dangerous cargo. In turn, the systems provide navigational information utilizing Coast Guard radio stations l8 9 On the East
Coast, where participation in the scheme is mandatory, the system has
been likened to air traffic control. 19°
Requirements to ensure that ships are equipped with modern on
board equipment is another area of regulatory concern. Standard navigational equipment on many vessels include satellite communication links,
electronic charts, and advanced radar.
The NavigatingAppliances and EquipmentRegulations1 91 provide,
for example, for the "appropriate" operation of electronic position fixing
equipment within certain areas. Several alternative types are permitted,
186

SOR/89-98,s. 3(1).

187

Ibid.ss 6(1)(a)(i) and 6(2)(a)-(g).

188

Plant, supra, note 183 at 81.

189

The Arctic Canada Traffic Zone (NORDREG) applies to ships of 300 tgt or more, while

the Western Canada Traffic Zone (WESTREG) applies to vessels of 500 tgt or more. Participation
in these schemes is, however, voluntary. See "Notice 25-Vessel Traffic Services," supra, note 182.
The Eastern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations, SOR/89-99, however, are mandatory

and apply to every ship of 500 tgt or more in the Eastern Canada VTS Zone (ECAREG), extending
to the entire twelve mile territorial sea.
19 0

Abeeassis et aL, supra, note 36 at para. 4-34.

191 SOR/84-689,as am. SOR/87-175.
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so long as the equipment is fully operational. Currently, the "Loran C"
electronic chart display system is used on the West Coast and throughout the United States. On the Atlantic coast, Canadian Coast Guard
vessels use Offshore Systems Ltd's "Precise Internal Navigation System."
The latter is soon to be used on a trial basis on the tanker run from
Valdez to Cherry Point on all vessels owned by Atlantic Richfield
192
Company.
The NavigatingAppliances and Equipment Regulations also
contain provisions for such on board equipment as compasses, radar,
plotting information, and radio direction-finding appliances. Specific
standards for such equipment are further set out in the "Standards for
Navigating Appliances and Equipment."19 3 Standards for radar and
navigational aids are set out in the "Standards for Navigating Lights,
Shapes, Sound Signal Appliances and Radar Equipment."19 4 Other
relevant regulations include the Steering Appliances and Equipment
Regulations,19 5 which provide for mandatory equipment such as rudder
indicators and auxiliary steering.
Pilotage requirements also provide a crucial component to a
comprehensive system of safe navigation. Pilots who are familiar with
local conditions and navigational hazards may be engaged to board and
guide vessels into major ports or through particularly sensitive areas.
Pilotage regulations, such as the General Pilotage Regulations,19 6 are
made pursuant to the national Pilotage Act.1 9 7

As well, the Act

establishes the Pacific, Arctic, Great Lakes, and Laurentian pilotage
regions and corresponding pilotage authorities.19 8 In certain Canadian
waters, pilotage is mandatory.1 99
A final element of importance is hydrographic charting. Such
information is crucial, not only for the safe navigation of vessels, but for
1 92

ProtectingOur Waters, supra,note 4 at 30 and Anderson, supra, note 7 at 39.

1 93

NavigatingAppliancesand EquipmentRegulations,supra,note 191, s. 5(1)(a), TP-3668.

194 IbidTP-1861.
195

SOR/83-810, as am. SOR/86-1027.

19 6

CR.C 1978, c. 1263.

19 7

1RS.C 1985, c. P-14.

198]bid. s. 3 and Schedule.
199

Pilotage authorities may make regulations making pilotage compulsory for certain areas.
Tbid. s. 20(a). See, for example, the Pacific PilotageRegulations, C.R.C 1978, c. 1270.
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effective response in the event of oil spills. The Canadian Hydrographic
Service of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is responsible for
upgrading all hydrographic charts. 200 Under the Chart and Publication
Regulations,201 both foreign and Canadian vessels are required to keep
current Canadian charts and various nautical publications while in
Canadian waters.
The West Coast provides a comprehensive local example of a
navigation system which is comprised of the elements described above,
yet is still seriously flawed in terms of actual safety. For example, the
Tanker Exclusion Zone (TEz) is a quasi-routing scheme for the offshore
waters of British Columbia,20 2 which, despite good planning, remains
deficient in practice. For one thing, the zone is applicable only to TAPS
° As well, compliance
vessels, other laden tankers need not observe it 203
with the TEZ is voluntary and is unenforceable. The mz is not mandated
by the NIo.2 0 4 Although the legislative authority exists to do so, Canadi200 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 28.
201 C.R.C. 1978, c. 1415 as am. SOR/79-585, SOR/79-731, and SOR/85-1042.
2 02

The boundaries of the zone are based on "the time it would take for a suitable salvage tug
to get to the scene of a disabled tanker and take it in tow before it grounded and caused serious
pollution." The present zone replaced what was initially a recognized TAPS tanker route. First
established in 1977, that route was cancelled by the U.S. Coast Guard in March 1982. It was
replaced by a new route in June 1985, which maintained a greater distance from shore. However,
this route was rejected by industry as being too costly. Finally, after further consultation with
industry, the current TEZ was established in 1989. See Federal Internal Review, "The West Coast
Tanker Exclusion Zone, Ship Routing and Related Matters: Prevention Issue Number 2" (Ottawa:
Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished] [hereinafter "Exclusion Zone"].
203 Several tankers laden with crude oil leave the Port of Vancouver each week, headed
primarily for the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. None are required to observe the TEZ guidelines. Only
U.S. registered tankers transitting from Alaska to U.S. ports on the West Coast are requested to do
so. Ibid.
204 The IMO designates protected areas as either "Special Areas" (according to provisions in
Annexes I, II, and V of MARPOL 73/78, supra, note 87) or "Areas to be Avoided." "Special Areas"
are defined as "a sea area where for recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical
and ecological condition and to the particular character of its traffic the adoption of special
mandatory methods for the prevention of pollution by oil (noxious liquid substances, garbage, as
applicable) is required." See also the report of the IMO Marine Environmental Protection
Committee, "Annex 8: Revised Criteria for the Designation of Special Areas and Identification of
Particularly Sensitive Areas (IMO Doe. W/7986 V/EWP)" in Report of the MaritimeEnvironment
Protection Committee on its Twenty-Ninth Session, MEPC 29/22, 1990, IMO Doc. W/7968v/EWP.
"Areas to be Avoided" are not generally compulsory, unless they are designated as such by the
coastal state. "Exclusion Zones" are recognized by the IMO through the provision of "Areas to be
Avoided."
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an regulations have not been drafted to mandate its use.2 05 As a result,
its efficacy is questionable. Indeed, the previous route was so disliked by
the oil industry that TAPs vessels "were not generally using the recommended routing system, and this fact was substantiated by CCG Vessel
Traffic Services (vrs) records." 206
In the event of a problem, the success of the zone hinges on the
speedy arrival of a salvage tug. Yet this is contingent on the ship's
captain immediately reporting the malfunction, and there is no means to
ensure that this occurs. 207 Finally, the degree of environmental protection offered by the m~z guidelines is questionable as the intention of the
zone was to prevent groundings. As the Internal Review notes,
potential environmental impacts from oil spilled as a result of a casualty other than
grounding were not considered in the establishment of the zone ...
Further analysis of oil
spill
drift trajectories and weathering of oil spilled offshore is required to determine if the
zone is sufficiently wide to protect the coastal environment. 2 0 8

Indeed, economic and political motivations have been influential in the
development of the zone boundaries and have led to a substantial
reduction in the zone's size since its inception in 1977.209
Vessel Traffic Services on the West Coast has also been singled
out as requiring a number of improvements. vrs is described as being a
"passive" system, providing only advice and information, unlike "active"
systems such as exist for air traffic ground control. "Active" Vessel

205 Enabling legislation to do so exists in section 562.1(1) of the CanadaShipping Act, supra,

note 59 which states that the "Governor in Council may, for the purpose of promoting safe and
efficient navigation or operation of ships or environmental protection, make regulations ...
(d)
respecting compulsory routes and recommended routes, including, without restricting the generality
of the foregoing, areas to be avoided, precautionary areas and inshore traffic zones, procedures to
be followed by ships in such routes, areas and zones, and other shipping traffic measures."

206 The TEZ was established as a substitute in early 1989 and is the only such zone currently
observed in Canada. See "Exclusion Zone," supra, note 202 at 2.

207 Infact, there is great incentive to do otherwise. Given the costly implications of turning
the vessel over to a salvage tug, a disabled tanker may well drift closer to shore as the owner or
operator tries to negotiate a satisfactory salvage contract. "Exclusion Zone," ibid. at 6. The

recently drafted IMO InternationalConvention on Salvage (28 April 1989) will ameliorate such

environmental danger by providing the salvor with an economic incentive to prevent or mitigate
environmental damage to the greatest extent possible. For further discussion, see C. Redgwell,
"The Greening of Salvage Law" (1990) 14:2 Marine Policy 142.

208 "Exclusion Zone," ibid at 2 and 9.
2 9

0 Ibid at 2-3.
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Traffic Services, staffed by experienced mariners, do exist near the ports
of Rotterdam and Hamburg, where vessels containing hazardous cargoes
must be surrounded by a "moving safety zone" into which other vessels
are prohibited from entering. 210 Because compliance with vrs procedures is voluntary on the West Coast, the system is essentially unenforceable.
The same is true for the Western Canada Traffic Zone or
VESTREG Canada. Established in 1987, the purpose of the system is "to
minimize environmental risks by screening vessels to ensure compliance
with Canadian regulations and joint u.s./Canadian regulatory requirements as set out in the Cooperative Vessel Traffic Management System
(crvMs) Agreement for shared contiguous waters." 211 While the system
may sound effective, it is not. Compliance is, again, voluntary-and only
25 per cent of all Alaska tankers carrying crude oil into Juan de Fuca
Strait participated in the system in early 1989.212
For these navigation systems to be effective, binding regulatory
compliance is clearly necessary. In addition, though, is the dependence
of the regulatory framework on the allocation of financial resources. In
the VTS system today, for example, "blind spots" exist on the North shore
no
of Vancouver Harbour and east of Second Narrows, and there is 213
radar coverage at all at the northern end of Vancouver Island.
Indeed, only one-eighth of the entire Tanker Exclusion Zone is under
radar surveillance by the Tofino Traffic Centre.214 On the West Coast,
many of the current radar systems were installed at the start of the
Alaskan tanker route in the mid-1970s and are now nearing the end of
when compared to state of the art technotheir useful lives, particularly
215
logy currently available.

210

Anderson, supra, note 7 at 41.

211 "Exclusion Zone," supra,note 202 at 9.
212 ibid. at 10.
213

InterimRepor supra, note 60 at 8. See also ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 196.

214 The only means of monitoring tankers for compliance with the TEZ guidelines resides in
the Tofino Traffic Centre, through occasional observance by the Canadian Armed Forces and
through the voluntary reporting system established under WESTREG. See "Exclusion Zone,"
supra, note 202 at 10.
215 Modem systems have improved resolution and range, as well as their capability in adverse
weather conditions. See Anderson, supra,note 7 at 41.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL_ 30 NO. 1

Other deficiencies are notable in other areas. For example, in
spite of its extreme traffic congestion and navigational hazards,2 16 there
is no pilotage requirement in the southern entrance to the Strait of Juan
de Fuca.2 1 7 Hydrographic charting along portions of the active tanker
routes on the Pacific coast is incomplete and out of date 21 8 Information
regarding local tidal movements experienced on the West Coast is not
indicated on charts. Of particular concern is the lack of knowledge
regarding currents at the mouth of the Strait of Juan de Fuca at certain
times of year, as well as information gaps regarding current patterns in
the Dixon Entrance and along the west coast of the Queen Charlotte
Islands.21 9 This lack of understanding was particularly apparent when oil
from the Nestucca washed ashore on Vancouver Island, despite Coast
Guard assurances that the currents would take it out to sea.
ii) Crew Standards
While Canada has been relatively prompt in keeping up with
international conventions on navigation and safety, it has lagged far
behind on crew standards. For example, Canada waited nearly ten years
before finally acceding to the Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (sTcw) on 6 November
1987.220 Although the sTcw entered into force for Canada on 6 February
1988,221 its actual provisions will not be implemented until February
1993, by which time all Canadian crews will have to have had their
endorsements updated and have undergone IMO accepted training.2 22

216 Traffic is particularly congested at the southern entrance to the Strait due to the
convergence of large foreign vessels operating within the 200 mile fishing zone, loaded crude oil
tankers outbound from the Port of Vancouver, tankers bound for oil refineries in the Puget Sound
and Gulf of Georgia, and, in the summer, hundreds of Canadian fishing vessels. Ibid. at 50.
217
Interim Report,supra, note 60 at 10.
218 This is true for the Atlantic coast as well. Ibid.
219 Anderson, supra, note 7 at 38.
220
Supra, note 113. Status of MultilateralConventions,supra, note 68 at 339.
2 21
22 2

Statusof MultilateralConventions, ibid.

Article 7 of the STCW, supra, note 113 allows a transitional period of up to five years for
contracting states, during which time they may continue issuing certificates in accordance with
previous legislation.
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The regulations, which will implement the 1993 STCW, are currently being
224
Safe
revised. 2 They are the Ships' Deck Watch Regulations, the
225 and the Lifesaving EquipmentRegulations.226
ManningRegulations,
Domestically, provisions for the training and certification of shipboard personnel are contained within Part II of the Canada Shipping
Act, entitled "Certification of Masters and Seamen." 227 Relevant regulations include the Safe ManningRegulations228 and the Ships' Deck Watch
Regulations.229 Foreign crews of non-Canadian ships may be subject to
the same regulations when in Canadian waters.230 However, foreign
crew certificates, if considered adequate, may be accepted in lieu of
Canadian certificates.231 Canadian crew certificates are generally
accepted worldwide, 232 as Canadian crews are generally recognized as
well trained by international standards.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that, of all polluting casualties
involving Canadian vessels in domestic waters, 70 per cent of those investigated are caused by human error.233 Several factors contribute to such
error, including reliance on industry, an absence of liability upon negli223 Personal communication with John Daniels, Training and Certification Section, Canadian
Coast Guard (Ottawa, 31 January 1991).

224 C.R.C. 1978, c. 1481.
225 C.R.C. 1978, c. 1466, as am. SOR/78-937 and SOR/79-438.
226

C.R.C. 1978, c. 1436.

227 Regulations regarding the training and certification of masters and seamen are made
pursuant to section 110(1). These regulations may prescribe, for example, "the types and classes of

certificates"; "classes of ships in respect of which a certificate is not valid"; "the qualifications ... that
an applicant for any type or class of certificate must meet"; "information to be furnished by an
applicant"; and "examinations relating to the granting of certificates." Regulations concerning
minimum crew size may be made pursuant to subsection 110(1)(j).
228
Supra, note 225.
229

Supra, note 224.

230

CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59, s. 112.

231 Ibid. s. 128.
232 Personal communication with Terry Stuart, Ship Safety Regional Office, Canadian Coast

Guard (Vancouver, 6 June 1989).
233 Federal Internal Review, "Prevention Issue Number 3: Analysis of Failure" (Ottawa:

Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) at para. 4.3.2.7 [unpublished] [hereinafter "Analysis of Failure"]. On
the whole, the Public Review Panel notes that human error is a factor in 90 per cent of the

incidents. See ProtectingOur Waters, supra,note 4 at 25.
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gent watch personnel, reduced crew sizes, resultant stress and fatigue
among crew members, and inadequate training.
The Internal Review notes that the government "tends to
remove itself from operational issues, thus leaving it up to industry to
carry out its business until another incident occurs." 234 There is, for
example, no provision which deals specifically with alcohol or substance
abuse despite the seriousness of the problem throughout the shipping
world. Instead, such matters are left to the discretion of industry policy
-a policy which is only selectively enforced, as the Exxon Valdez spill
made so painfully clear in the u.s.
The disaster in Prince William Sound also highlighted the need
for an adequate number of alert and responsible watch personnel. In
Canada, however, there is no requirement under existing legislation
which permits direct prosecution of those in charge of a navigational
watch for negligently grounding their ships.23 S
Reduced crew sizes is another area for serious concern and has
been estimated as the most significant single cause of accidents leading
to pollution damage. 23 6 Obviously, small crew sizes result in stress,
fatigue, and diminished emergency response capability. Yet, as an
economy measure, crew sizes have been continuously reduced throughout the merchant marine fleet. The result is fewer personnel working
longer hours. Twelve to fourteen hour workdays have become the norm,
with crews working up to twenty-four hours straight during loading.
Some Alaskan tanker crews have been reduced from forty to twenty-one
in five years. In 1985, the u.s. Coast Guard certificates for the Exxon
Valdez required a crew of twenty, only sixteen were required in 1989.237
Canadian law does little to prevent such stresses upon crew
members.23 8 As the Public Review Panel observes, the Safe Manning

234 "Analysis of Failure," ibid. at para. 4.4.3.1.
235 Federal Internal Review, "Final Discussion Paper: Prevention Issue Number 4" (Ottawa:

Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished] [hereinafter "Prevention Issue Number 4"].
23 6

23

ProtectingOurWaters, supra, note 4 at 26.

7 See R. Behar, "Joe's Bad Trip" Time (24 July 1989) 42 at 47 and Anderson, supra, note 7

at 47.
238 Section 110(1)0) of the Canada ShippingAct, supra, note 59 provides for the making of
regulations setting out minimum crew size aboard particular vessels. Yet, unlike the airline
industry, no regulation controls the practice of allowing crew members to become dangerously
fatigued. See "Prevention Issue Number 4," supra, note 235 at para. 4.1.38.

1992]

A Black (And Rising?) Tide

209

Regulations "permit 18 hours of work in any one day period, 32 hours in

these limits do not allow for
two days and 48 hours in three days ...

adequate rest for tanker officers involved in high-stress and high-risk
operations." 39 Moreover, there is evidence that even these low
standards are not enforced by the Coast Guard, and many crew
members are reluctant to complain, for fear of losing their jobs.240
Finally, training of shipboard personnel, particularly in the area
of pollution prevention and marine spills response, is inadequate. 241
Perhaps, the most glaring deficiency of all is the lack of legally mandated
crew certification standards for tugboats, even though (as happened with
the Nestucca spill) the tug may be engaging in the transportation of
pollutant oils and hazardous chemicals without formal crew certification
or training.
C. Jurisdictionand Enforcement
1. Introduction
Enforcement is the underpinning of any legal regime, without
which the most visionary and meticulously drafted legislation will be
ineffective. In turn, a state's ability to enforce the law is contingent on
its having the jurisdictional authority to do so. Historically, however, the
international regime has long been deficient in conferring regulatory
jurisdiction over vessel pollution on coastal states. This is particularly
true for actions on the "high seas," where the flag state has traditionally
enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of its vessels. In turn,
the authority of the coastal state has been primarily restricted to its
territorial waters.
The history of the evolution of the law away from this almost
exclusively flag state regime has been well recounted in the literature
and need not be repeated here 2 4 2 Again, disasters, such as the grounding of the Torrey Canyon, played an essential role by giving the coastal

239 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 27.
240 Ibid.
241 Ibi. at 25-26.
242 See, for example, Lewis Alexander.
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state the right to intervene in the event of a spill 243 In addition, MARPOL
73 provided for an improved right of inspection for coastal states.
Partially through the issuance and inspection of "Pollution Prevention
Certificates," coastal states could more easily monitor-but not enforce
-- compliance of standards within their own waters? 44 However, when
MARPOL was drafted, the more contentious issues of jurisdiction and
enforcement were left to the negotiations of the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference (uNcLos III), the results of which now provide
the jurisdictional setting for international and domestic enforcement
activities.
2. The Jurisdictional Setting
As oil spills proliferated on the world's shorelines throughout the
1960s and 1970s, it became obvious that the helpless reliance of coastal
states on flag state enforcement of pollution prevention standards was
no longer acceptable. This is particularly true for coastal states (such as
Canada), which possess relatively small international shipping fleets, yet
suffer the burden of pollution from foreign traffic passing their shores.
Since the inception of both the IMO and the first Law of the Sea Conference in 1958, the work of each has coincided with the other.
Although interwoven, the work of the two bodies is distinct. The IMO has
focused on the more technical questions of pollution prevention and
compensation, while the various law of the sea conferences have been
concerned with the broader issues of the allocation of jurisdictional
rights and duties among states. In short, UNCLOS provides the jurisdictional setting for more specific regulation of oil pollution.
The law of the sea conferences produced international
conventions in 1958, 1960, and 1982. UNCLOS x, as the 1982 treaty is

called, provides the basic jurisdictional setting for contemporary
2 43

See the 1969 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of

Oil Pollution Casualties, 29 November 1969, 26 U.T.S. 765, T.I.A.S. No. 8068, 970 U.N.T.S. 211,
reprinted in 9 1.LM. 25 [effective 6 May 1975]. See Status ofMultilateral Conventions, supra, note

68 at 175. This Convention strikes a balance between the traditionally exclusive powers of the flag
state and new authority in the coastal state which can "intervene" in such disasters, with the latter
being required to consult with parties known to be affected and to "take into account" their views.
244 Inspectors could neither enforce standards nor penalize offenders; rather, they were
permitted only to report violations to the flag state. See A. E.Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the
Law of the Sea Convention" (1985) 79:2 Am. J. Int'l L. 347 at 362.
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pollution control efforts. 245 Capping a marathon diplomatic endeavour

spanning almost ten years (an effort in which Canada played an
important role), 246 UNcLos iii has been justifiably called "the single most

important 7instrument relating to the law of the sea ever to be
24

adopted."
The most significant issues discussed at the conference

concerned the jurisdiction both to establish and enforce standards,
particularly as these related to coastal state authority. During the nego-

tiations, Canada continued to lobby actively for an extension of these
powers, both within the territorial sea and beyond. These efforts were

successful. First, controversy which had long centred around jurisdiction
and territorial rights resulted in the establishment of an "exclusive

economic zone" (EEz), which extended up to 200 nautical miles from the
coast.248 Second, coastal state authority was considerably strengthened
in cases where a ship in violation of international standards enters one of

245 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, U.N. Doec. A/CONF.
621122 (1982), Misc. 11 (1983), Cmnd 8941, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
246 Canada was an active participant in the conference, but was also one of the nations which
pushed the international community into the negotiations as a result of its domestic legal actions.
In 1970, three years before the first sessions of UNCLOS was held, Canada issued a substantial
challenge to the principle of "freedom of the seas" through its landmark piece of domestic
legislation, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, supra, note 151. Section 3 of the Act
established a 100 mile pollution control zone in Arctic waters, which gave Canada limited
environmental jurisdiction over activities within the entire area. As well, theAct provided for the
establishment of "shipping safety control zones" (s. 11), for which it authorized the Governor in
Council to make regulations concerning standards for vessel design, equipment, navigation, and
manning (s. 12). See also the Arctic Shipping Pollution PreventionRegulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 353,
and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 354. Moreover, the Act
allowed for the establishment of a comprehensive liability and compensation regime for the zone (s.
6). Liability was to be absolute (s. 7). No limits of liability were specified; these were left to the
regulations which potentially could allow for unlimited liability (s. 6(1)). All discharges of "waste"
were prohibited within the zone (s. 4(1)). Pollution prevention officers were designated (s. 14) and
given broad powers of enforcement (s. 15). Violators could be fined up to $100,000 (s. 18).
The Act represented a key Canadian initiative to promote environmental and jurisdictional
rights at the international law level. It was significant in two ways. First, in spite of its international
ramifications, it was enacted unilaterally. Second, theAct's pollution control zone dramatically
exceeded the traditionally accepted twelve mile boundary of coastal state jurisdiction. The move
arose as much out of a jurisdictional dispute with the United States over sovereignty in the Arctic as
it did out of environmental concern. For further discussion, see M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra, note
160.
24 7
Abecassis et al, supra, note 36 at para. 5-02.
248

UNCLOS III, supra, note 245, art. 57.
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its ports or offshore terminals (so-called "port state jurisdiction"), regardless of whether the violations took place beyond the territorial sea or
exclusive economic zone or within them.249
Moreover, some inroads were made concerning coastal state
authority over foreign ships exercising the rights of "innocent passage"
within the territorial sea. Thus, laws and regulations concerning transport and navigation may be enacted by the coastal state, so long as these
conform to standards established by international law 25 0 However, the
term "innocent passage" was even more strictly defined under uNCLOS i,
ultimately resulting in somewhat narrower coastal state jurisdiction. 251
In the final analysis, UNcLos iii resulted in strengthened coastal

and port state authority and improved enforcement provisions
generally.252 Ultimately, however, the flag state was retained as the
basic jurisdiction of standard setting and enforcement, particularly on
the high sea. The shift away from the long standing tradition of virtually
exclusive flag state control was achieved with great difficulty. As one
author notes, "Many countries have not signed or ratified the Law of the
Sea Convention because they refuse to accept these encroachments on
traditional navigational sovereignty." 253 The United States, with several
other industrialized countries, is one of these countries creating a
significant obstacle to the entry into force of UNCLOS HI. However, many

of its provisions (including those concerning coastal and port state rights,
described above) are by now so widely accepted that they are recognized
as customary international law. 254

249bid.arts 218(1) and 220(1).
2 50

/I& art. 17.

251 Article 19 lists a series of acts which define when a passage is not innocent. According to
this definition, a ship's passage is altered only by its intention, rather than by the condition of the
ship itself. Passage is not innocent only when the subsequent discharge of pollution is both
.serious" and "wilful." Under these terms, then, almost all passage is innocent, aside from
operational discharges, few tanker operators deliberately plan to spill their cargoes into the oceans.
Ibid.
252 The Internal Federal Review notes that UNCLOS III "contains the best and most
comprehensive enforcement provisions of any convention." See "Prevention Issue Number 4,"
supra, note 235 at para. 4.3.1.
253 Curtis, supra, note 12 at 709
254 For further discussion, see Boyle, supra, note 244. See also Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36
at para. 5-46-5-50.
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3. Enforcement
Enforcement regimes are of many types. These include international, bilateral or multilateral, private industry, and domestic regimes.
The majority of these regimes focus on vessel design and equipment
standards. The enforcement of navigation and, to a lesser degree,
discharge standards is more problematic, particularly within international waters.
a) International
Several of the international conventions discussed above provide
for enforcement through a form of "administrative" action which relies
on inspection and certification programs. Following regular inspections,
appropriate certificates are issued to ships which are deemed to have
been constructed and maintained according to appropriate regulations.
Without such certificates, ships cannot sail.
i) Operational Pollution
The enforcement of discharge standards is relatively straightforward. Under the now defunct 1954 Convention, monitoring for
compliance with operational discharge standards was limited to a system
of "voluntary reporting," through the maintenance of "oil record
books." 255 The 1969 amendments improved the situation somewhat by
allowing visual sighting of a vessel unlawfully discharging oil to constitute an additionally valid form of evidence 25 6 MARPOL 73/78 led to
significant improvements in mandating recordkeeping and permitting
effective inspection. Oil record books were maintained, but changed in
format.25 7 Vessels are subject to regular inspections to ensure that they
maintain the construction, equipment, and fittings necessary to comply

255
256

Supra, note 34, art. IX.

Supra, note 66. This was because the 1969 Amendments made all discharges prima facie
unlawful due to the requirement to implement a new "load-on-top" (LOT) pollution reduction
procedure. See Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36 at para. 3-104.
257
MARPOL 73/78, supra,note 87, App. I, r. 20.
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with the discharge standards.2 58 Those found to be in compliance are
issued "International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificates." 259 When
violations occur within the jurisdiction of a contracting state, that state
must either
(a) cause proceedings to be taken in accordance with its law; or

(b) furnish to the administration of the ship such information and evidence as may be in
260
its possession that a violation has occurred.

Thus, all member states are required to enforce MARPOL within their
jurisdiction, 261 as "jurisdiction" is defined by international law at the
time 2 62
ii) Navigation and Safety
SOLAS 74/78 provides for mandatory annual-and even
unscheduled-inspections of vessels by flag states during the period of
validity of their certificates. 263 Port states also have some inspection
authority and may detain substandard vessels until the defects have been
remedied? 64 Similar provisions are contained within MARPOL 73/78265 and
the 1960 InternationalConvention on Load Lines. 266 As well, MARPOL 73/78
obliges the ship's master or owner to report significant defects as well as
accidents to the flag state or issuer of the "Pollution Prevention Certificate." 267
Private sector inspection and certification programmes exist
under the auspices of classification societies as well as directly under
states. Generally, such inspections occur in order for commercial vessels

2 58

Ibid r. 4.

259 ]bid. r. 5-6.
2 60

ibid. art. 4(2).

261 Ibi

262 Ibid. r. 9(3).
263

SOLAS 74/78, supra, note 87, c.1, r. 6.

264/bia. r. 19.
2 65

MARPOL 73/78, supra, note 87 art. 5, Annex I, r. 4-8, and Appendix II.

266 5 April 1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133, arts 12-21 as am.
267MARPOL 73/78, supra,note 87, Annex I, r. 4(4)(c).
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to obtain insurance 2 68 However, classification societies may also inspect
vessels and issue certificates of compliance for international conventions, including MARPOL, soLAs, and the InternationalConvention on Load
Lines.2 69 In either case, such work is usually done for the owner of the
vessel. Information obtained in this way on the condition of the vessel
may be confidential, except as required by law.27°
As noted above, effective enforcement regimes are, to a great
degree, restricted to construction and equipment standards. Sheer
logistical considerations make enforcement of navigational standards
more difficult. For one, it is inherently more awkward to identify offenders of navigation practices than it is of construction or equipment
requirements. With respect to COLREG, for example, or, indeed, traffic
separation schemes in general, valid identification must be comprised,
not only of a radar trace, but also of visual identification 71 Further,
even the enforcement of proven contraventions which occur in international waters is limited to notifying the flag state. Abecassis and
Jarashow comment:
Enforcement is, therefore, a process of ex post facto prosecution of offenders. This is
possible fairly speedily if and when the ship reaches a port in the coastal state (if the
offence occurred within the jurisdiction of the coastal state). Otherwise, it is a question
2 72
of relying on prosecution by the flag state itself.

The inspection and certification of crew standards is similarly
problematic. The wording of the sTcw, for example, is ambiguous. Its
268 Federal Internal Review, "Policy Issue: Enforcement" (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard,
1989) at para. 3.2.2 [unpublished] [hereinafter "Enforcement"].
269 In 1988, the IMO held the International Conference on Harmonized System of Survey and
Certification at which protocols to the InternationalConvention on Load Lines, supra, note 266 and
to SOLAS 74, supra, note 86 were adopted. See Protocol Relating to the 1966 International
Convention on Load Lines, 11 November 1988, IMO Doe HSSCICONF/12 and ProtocolRelatingto
the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 11 November 1988, IMO Doc
HSSC/CONF/11. On 16 March 1990, MARPOL 73/78, supra, note 87 was further amended, so that
now all three Conventionshave harmonized their individual systems of inspection and certification.
See Adoption of Amendments to the Annex of the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International
Conventionfor the Prevention ofPollutionfrom Ships, 1973 (Introductionof the Harmonized System of
Survey and Certificationto Annexes I and Iof MARPOL 73/78), Res. MEPC 39(29), MEPC 29th
Sess., Doc. MEPC 20/22, Annex 5 (1990).
270 Anderson, supra, note 7 at 44.
271

Abecassis et al., supra, note 36 at para. 4-38.

272

Ibid. para. 4-40.
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interpretation and implementation is essentially left up to the flag
state.273 Inspections by port states are limited to verifying that crew
certificates are valid.274 Ships may be detained only for deficiencies in
proper watch arrangements or for improper certifications which are not
corrected, and then only if these deficiencies are potentially threatening
to the environment, persons, or property2 75
In general, the international and private sector inspection
regimes noted above are considered inadequate. Both in Canada and
internationally, enforcement of national and international regulations
seldom results in prosecutions. Rather, the mere detainment of
substandard vessels until the defects are remedied is more typical. The
Federal Internal Review notes that this weak system of enforcement is
due largely to "conflicting interests of port, coastal and flag states, and
the varying interests of governments, private industry and the public."27 6
This is a most serious problem capable of rendering illusory the
international regulatory gains of the last twenty years.
In response to this problem, several nations concluded a more
limited multilateral agreement known as the Memorandum of Understandingon PortState Control.277 The agreement was drawn up at Paris
on 26 January 1982 and supersedes the 1978 Memorandum of
Understandingbetween CertainMaritimeAuthorities on the Maintenance
of Standards on Merchant Ships. 278 While recognizing that the primary
responsibility for enforcement rests with the flag state, the agreement
allows for greater diligence on the part of port states in enforcing
international conventions. There are, however, only fourteen full
2 73

See above, section III.B.1. b) iii) at 193.

274 If the port state inspector finds that a seafarer fails to hold an appropriate valid certificate
or valid dispensation, the ship may be detained until the requirements have been met. However,
unless there are "clear grounds" for believing that certificates are fraudulent or have been
fraudulently obtained, they must be accepted. As well, the inspector must provide written notice
stating the grounds upon which it has been determined that any deficiencies found pose a danger to
persons, property, or the environment. See STCW, supra, note 113, c. I, r. 4. However, article X(4)
requires that all possible efforts must be made to ensure that the ship is not unduly detained or
delayed. Thus, the requirements on the part of the port state are onerous.
275 Ibid art. X(3) and c. I, r. 4.

276 "Enforcement," supra, note 268 at para. 3.2.3.
277 26 June 1982 (Paris), reprinted in 21 I.LM. 1.
278 2 March 1978 (The Hague). See ibid. at s. 8.3.
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member states, all from Western Europe and Scandinavia. In addition,
both Canada and the United States are co-operative members, "though
the u.s. does not yet directly report to the organization the results of
'

foreign flag inspections. "279

The Memorandum commits its members to inspecting a
minimum of 25 per cent of all foreign tankers visiting their ports, and the
results are not encouraging-approximately half of all vessels inspected
in Canada under the agreement are found to be substandard2 80 The
imo has also acknowledged the need for more diligent enforcement of
international standards. On 19 October 1990, members of the 16th
Assembly of the IMO unanimously adopted a resolution which "urges
states to fulfil their obligations to carry out investigations of maritime
casualties" 281 and to ensure that these investigations are comprehensive.
b) Canadian
Compliance with domestic standards regarding the construction,
equipment, and operation of vessels transporting oil is determined by
the Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations,282 the Non-Canadian Ships
Compliance CertificatesRegulations,283 and the Arctic Shipping Pollution
PreventionRegulations.28 4 Purportedly, these are "strictly enforced." 285
are contained within
Major provisions for inspection and certification
28 6
Parts V and XV of the Canada ShippingAct.
Part V of the CanadaShippingAct, entitled "Safety," establishes
the Steamship Inspection Service. Steamship inspectors are appointed
by the Governor in Council and are authorized to inspect the machinery,

279

"Enforcement," supra, note 268 at para. 3.2.5.

280

Ibid.

281 Co-operation In Maritime Casualty Investigations, Res. A.637(16), IMO Assembly 16th
Sess., Doc. IMO-136E (1989) at 6.
282
Supra, note 164.
283 C.R.C. 1978, c. 1451, as am. SOR/79-904 and SOR/80-728.
284

Supra, note 246.
285 "Notice 32-Pollution--Compliance with Canadian Regulations" in Notice to Mariners,
supra, note 178, 172 at 172.
28 6

Supra, note 59.
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hulls, equipment, and electrical installations of steamships. 287 Such
inspectors have the right to board ships "at all reasonable times" in
order to inspect either the vessel itself or "any certificate of any master,
mate or engineer."288 Ships deemed to be unsafe may be detained. 28 9
Shipboard personnel in positions of authority are obligated to answer
"pertinent questions concerning the ship, or concerning any accident
that has happened thereto." 290 As well, the steamship inspector may
have machinery put in motion to "satisfy himself as to its condition 291
and may check for proper navigation lights and other equipment as
required under coLREG 72.292 The inspector may check for "proper certificated officers, navigating and engineering," as required by the Canada
9 Finally, all costs of
ShippingAct M
the inspection are to be born by the
29
4
shipowner.
So-called "Safety Convention" ships-that is, ships of flag states
which are party to soLs-of 500 tgt or more are also subject to regular
inspections. These must take place on first being put into service.
Thereafter, inspections must occur annually for the hull and machinery2 9s and once every two years for equipment.29 6 Non-convention ships
must be inspected annually.2 97
Classification societies may also act on behalf of a government
for some, if not all, of that government's inspection responsibilities 98
Regulations may be made prescribing the classes of ships and specific
287bid.s. 301. The nature of such inspections is set out in sections 310 and 311.
288

Ibid. s.310(l).

289 Ibid.s.310(2).
29 0

lbt s. 310(3).

291 Ibid.s. 310(4).
292ibid s. 311(1).
2 93

Iid

2 94

bid.s. 313(1).

295 Ibid. s. 316(2)(b). Section 316(2)(b) provides for exceptions to be made according to
regulations as may be prescribed under section 319(5)(f), which refers to inspections made by
authorized classification societies. In such cases, the period between inspections by steamship
inspectors may not exceed twenty-five years.
296Ibid s. 316(2)(a).
29 7

kid. s.316(3). The same exemptions may apply as outlined in subsection 316(2)(b).

298

1id s. 319(4).
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219

societies which may apply, the scope of inspections to be undertaken by
these societies, the terms and conditions of the report to be submitted,
and the length of time for which certificates may be valid, for up to
twenty-five years.299 These societies are given much authority and are
relied on heavily. For example, steamship inspectors are not liable for
issuing certificates based on inaccurate or faulty reports of classification
30o
societies.
Part XV of the Canada Shipping Act, specifically entitled
"Pollution Prevention and Control," is the central enforcement section
in the Canada Shipping Act insofar as the government's agents in the
field, Pollution Prevention Officers (Ppos), are appointed by the Minister
of Transport under it.301 They also conduct inspections, but have limited
enforcement and investigative powers under the Act on Canadian ships
anywhere, as well as on ships about to enter or within applicable Canadian waters9' 2
The authority of Pos is very similar to that of steamship inspec3
0
3
rPos may direct personnel aboard Canadian ships or foreign
tors.
ships about to enter or within Canadian waters to provide "reasonable
information" concerning the ship's condition, equipment, cargo, and
fuel.304 They may also board and inspect all Canadian ships, as well as
foreign ships whose flag states are not party to mARPOL, to ensure that
the ship is in compliance with regulations made under Part XV or
concerning Vessel Traffic Services under section 562.305
Ships to which MARPOL applies are inspected in accordance with
its terms.306 Oil samples of ships suspected of illegally discharging oil
may be collected anywhere within applicable waters. 307 Pros also have
299 bid. s. 319(5)(a)-(f).
300 bid. s. 319(6).
3 01

1bid. s. 661(1). See also section 14 of theArctic WatersPollutionPreventionAc supra, note

3 02

CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59, s. 662(l)-(3).

151.
303 However, whereas steamship inspectors are primarily concerned with inspecting

compliance with SOLAS, PPOs are more concerned with the provisions of MARPOL.
3 04

CanadaShippingAct supra, note 59, s. 662(l)(a).

305 bi&s. 662(1)(b) -c).
30

6 Ibid. s. 662(1)(d).
307Ibid. s. 662(1)(e).
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the authority to exercise control over the movement of a ship if it is
either substandard or otherwise in violation of the provisions of Part
XV, if weather conditions are hazardous, or if a pollution incident is
threatened or occurring 08
Penalties are substantial for those found in contravention of the
provisions of Part XV. Persons or ships found guilty of illegally discharging pollutants may be fined a maximum of $250,000.09 Fines for
failure to carry appropriate certificates may be as high as $200,000.310
Disobeying the direction of a Ppo may lead to a fine of up to $200,000.11
Finally, refusing to assist a i'Po may lead to a maximum fine of
$10,000.312 As well, the ri'o may detain vessels thought or found to have
committed an offence under Part XV. This power may be exercised in
all Canadian waters, including fishing zones, as well as waters to which
the Arctic Waters PollutionPreventionAct applies.313
The Coast Guard Ship Inspection Report System (sIRSl) is used
in Canada to administer inspection and certification. 314 Generally,
tankers are visually inspected by the Ship Safety branch of the Coast
Guard upon first entering Canadian waters. After that, however,
tankers are inspected only occasionally on subsequent visits. 315 Inspection of foreign vessels are generally limited to ensuring that valid
convention certificates are carried aboard. Inspections may be more
detailed if the inspector deems the vessel to be substandard. 316
These legal provisions are clearly strong ones. However, translating these into practical and effective monitoring and enforcement has
not been as strong. The current objective of Ship Safety is to inspect 25
per cent of all foreign tankers entering Canadian ports. In 1988,
however, only 8 per cent of these were inspected-and a large number of
3 8

osbU s. 662(1)(O-(h).

309Ibid s. 664.
3 10

/bid.s. 665.

31 1

bid. s. 666(1).

312

i& s. 666(2).

313
314

1bid. s. 672(1)-(2).
"Enforcement," supra,note 268 at para. 3.2.1.

315 Anderson,supra, note 7 at 43.
316 Federal Internal Review, "Policy 3.4" (Ottawa:
[unpublished].

Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) at 2

A Black (And Rising?) Tide

1992]

them required repairs before being allowed to leave port.3 17 In addition,
enforcement of Canadian and international shipping regulations results
in few prosecutions. There appears to be no incident of a foreign vessel
being denied entry into Canadian waters off the West Coast, although
vessels have occasionally been denied exit until deficiencies in their crew
or equipment have been rectified. 318 Moreover, because Ship Safety
lacks full access to the accident histories and the maintenance and repair
records of foreign vessels, it is difficult to make special provision for
those vessels which may be "repeat offenders." 319
In general, while inspection of Canadian standards is considered
reasonably good, enforcement within Canada is widely criticized as
inadequate, even within the Coast Guard. The Federal Internal Review
notes:
The enforcement of standards and regulations is presently less than satisfactory and is the
area that has been identified as requiring the most improvement. Lack of meaningful
enforcement leads to a certain disrespect for the standards and regulations and can
encourage owners and operators to place undue emphasis on economic considerations at

the expense of safety and pollution prevention. Such lax or nonexistent enforcement will
negate the best intentions incororated in national, bilateral and international safety and
20
pollution prevention programs.

The result is a much higher risk to Canadian waters than is
anticipated by the legislation. On these issues, the federal and provincial
commissions come to similar conclusions. As the British Columbia study
noted, deficiencies are so frequently uncovered during tanker inspections that we can conclude that "the overall quality of vessels, equipment
and crews entering Canadian ports is well below what is required to
protect our waters." 321
In this vein, the institutional enforcement mechanism set up by
the Canada ShippingAct is deficient. Pollution Prevention Officers are
too few in number, poorly trained, and reluctant to prosecute. 322 In
part, this is because of their limited authority under theAct, their limited
3 17

interim Repor4 supra, note 60 at 9 and ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 22.

318

Anderson, supra, note 7 at 43.

319

1bid

320 "Prevention Issue Number 4," supra, note 235 at para. 3.6.1.
321

Anderson, supra, note 7 at 43.

322 See, for example, ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 23-24.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 NO. I

training in enforcement and prosecution techniques, and their lack of
formal criminal authority and training (they are not sworn in as peace
officers or trained in the gathering of evidence).3 23 The Coast Guard
attributes the neglect of enforcement to several broader issues in
addition to the need for more trained inspectors experienced in legal
enforcement procedures, including the maritime tradition of flag state
control and the complexity of the domestic and international legal
regime.3 24
IV. THE STATE OF THE LAW:
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION
A. InternationalLaw
The Torrey Canyon incident in 1967 vividly highlighted the
inadequacies of the existing international regime concerning liability and
compensation. Two particularly significant questions were raised by the
spill. The first was the question over the nature and extent of the
shipowner's liability in such cases. There are several ways in which
liability for damage may be established. Liability may be absolute 3 25
strict,3 26 based on fault with a reversed burden of proof,327 or finally,
based on fault.3 28 In the maritime tradition, liability had long been
based upon fault, the regime which least favours the victims of pollution
damage.
A second question centred around the limits of liability of the
owners of the Torrey Canyon. The international convention in force at
323 These issues are discussed in several Federal Internal Review documents, including the
following: "Analysis of Failure," supra, note 233 at para. 4.1.1-4.1.9 and "Enforcement," supra, note
268.
324 "Prevention Issue Number 4," supra, note 235 at para. 3.6.1-3.6.2.
325 That is, the party causing the damage is liable without exception, regardless of the
circumstances.
326 This regime is also rigorous and still imposes liability on the party causing the damage,
whether or not that party is at fault, but with certain exceptions.
32 7
Thus, the onus is on the party to prove that the incident did not occur as a result of his or
her negligence.
328 In such cases, the claimant must prove that the damage resulted from the party's

negligence.
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the time was the widely accepted 1957 Brussels Convention on the

Limitation of Liability of Owners of Sea Going Ships,329 the limits of

which were vastly inadequate. 330 The outcry over these and other issues

prompted the IwCo to quickly begin drafting new legislation in the area
of international liability and compensation in 1969.331
1. Tovalop/Cristal

The first significant provision for liability in the case of oil spills
was devised by the oil industry itself on 7 January 1969. Responding to
mounting public pressure and hoping to forestall possible unilateral
action by coastal states at the upcoming IMCO conference, the tanker
industry established the Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning

Liability for Oil Pollution (TovALoP) in January 1969.332 The Contract
Regardinga Supplement to Tanker Liabilityfor Oil Pollution (CRzSTAL) was

established on 14 January 1971 by the oil industry as a supplement to
TOVALOP. 333 Both agreements remain in effect and have been amended
from time to time.

329 10 October 1957,52 U.K.T.S. 355 (1968), Cmnd 3678, 1959 R.T.A.F. 46.
330 Article 3 of the Convention set the shipowner's limit of liability for property damage at
1,000 gold francs (equivalent to approximately $67 at the time of the incident) per ton of the ship's
tonnage. The quantifiable costs of the damages were estimated at approximately $18 million. This
was the first time that the costs of damages so exceeded the value of the ship and its cargo. See P.
Burrows, C. Rowley & D. Owen, "The Economics of Accidental Oil Pollution by Tankers in Coastal
Waters" (1974) 3 J. of Pub. Econ. at 258.
331 For a discussion of the negotiations leading up to the 1969 conference, see M'Gonigle &
Zacher, supra,note 35 at 149-54.
332 TOVALOP is a voluntary scheme by which participating tanker owners are required to
obtain liability insurance through either the Protection and Indemnity Associations (the so-called
"P and I Clubs") or the International Tankers Indemnity Association. See clause 11(c). Current
limits of liability under TOVALOP are $3.5 million (U.S.) for tankers of up to 5,000 gross tons, and
another $493 (U.S.) for each additional ton, to a maximum limit of $70 million (U.S.). Anderson,
supra,note 7 at 105. For further discussion, see M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra, note 35 at 157-59. See
also Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36 at 304-10.
333 Reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 137. In order to apply, the contract stipulates that the tanker
owner must first pay compensation up to the limits of TOVALOP. Moreover, the oil on board the
vessel must be owned by a CRISTAL member. For further discussion, see M'Gonigle & Zacher,
supra, note 35 at 178-82.
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2. The 1969 Civil Liability Convention
By the end of the year and influenced at least in part by the
industry's initiative, iMco created the Civil Liability Convention (cLc)934
The CLc establishes strict liability on the shipowner 335 with limited
defences.3 36 Shipowners can invoke their right to limit liability only by
paying into a court fund,33 7 provided they themselves are not
negligent3 38 One particular innovation of the CLc is the requirement
that all ships carrying over 2,000 tons of oil as cargo and entering the
ports of contracting states must possess full insurance to the limit of the
shipowner's liability, regardless of whether the flag states themselves are
contracting parties 339 This eliminated a potential competitive advantage for those flag states not party to the cC and settled the question of
jurisdiction, which now clearly resided with the court of the contracting
state which suffers environmental damage, regardless of the original
location of the pollutant or whether the flag state is party.
A particularly contentious issue concerned the territorial scope
of the Convention, which was restricted "to pollution damage caused on
the territory including the territorial sea of a contracting state, and to
preventive measures taken to prevent or minimize such damage." 340
Thus, even measures taken beyond the territorial sea to prevent or
mitigate subsequent damages within the territorial sea could be subject
to compensation.
Liability limits were set at approximately $219 (133 SDRS) for
each ton of the ship's tonnage, to a maximum of $23 million (14 million
334 InternationalConvention on Civil Liability for Oil PollutionDamage, 29 November 1969,
106 U.K.T.S. (1975), Cmnd 61835, 4 I.N.T.I.R. 257, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 45
[hereinafter CLC]. For a comparison between TOVALOP and the CLC, see Abecassis et aL, supra,
note 36 at 307-10.
335
CLC ibid art. lI(1).
336 These include an act of war; a "natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character"; an intentional act of a third party; governmental negligence in the
maintenance of navigational aids; or, finally, a situation where the damage resulted from an
intentional act of the person who suffered the harm. Tbid. art. II(2)-(3).
337 oid art. V(3).
338ibid art.V(2).
339bid art. VII(11).
34 0
Ibid art. H. For further discussion, see M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra,note 35, c. 7.
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Even in 1969, however, this limit was recognized as being too
low, and IMcO members resolved to draft a supplementary convention in
SDRS).9 41

1971.342

3. 1971 Fund Convention
The International Convention on the Establishment of an
InternationalFundfor Compensationfor Oil PollutionDamage3 43 (Fund
Convention) was established in 1971 to supplement the levels of
compensation available under the CLC 44 Liability under the Fund
Convention is strict, with fewer defences compared to the CLC. 45 The
Fund Convention may also be exempted wholly or partially if it can prove
that damages resulted wholly or partially from the claimant's own
negligence or intentional act.346 The Fund Convention is liable for
natural disasters, but with an overall limit of about $49 million (30
million sDRs), 3 4 7 regardless of the resulting number of individual
incidents. 34

341 Ibid. art. V(1). Note that the unit of account was changed from gold francs to Special
Drawing Rights (SDRs), as defined by the International Monetary Fund, with the creation of the
1976 Protocolto the CLC. See Protocolto the 1969 InternationalConvention on Civil Liabilityfor Oil
PollutionDamage 19 November 1976, U.K.T.S. 26 (1981), Cmnd 8238, reprinted in 16 I.LM. 617.
One Special Drawing Right was valued at $1.6459 (Cdn.) on 5 January 1991. See The [Toronto]
Globe andMail (5 January 1991) B13.
342 Resolution on Establishment of the International Compensation Fundfor Oil Pollution
Damage, LEG/CONF/C.2IVP.38, Official Records, International Legal Conference on Marine
Pollution Damage (1969) (London: IMCO, 1973) at 185.
343 18 December 1971, U.K.T.S. 95 (1978), Cmnd 7383, 1978 R.T.A.F. 81, reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 284 [hereinafter Fund Convention].
344/'Ib art. 4(1).
345 These include an act of war or incidents where the claimant is unable to identify the
polluting ship. Ibid. art. 4(2)(a)-(b). In other words, "mystery spills" are not covered under the
IOPC Fund.
3

46Ibi art. 3(3).
347 As with the CLC; the unit of account was changed from gold francs to Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) with the 1976 Protocol to the 1971 InternationalConvention on the Establishmentof
an InternationalFundfor Compensationfor Oil Pollution Damage, 19 November 1976, Misc. 27
(1977), Cnnd 7029, reprinted in 16 IL.M. 621.
3 48

Fund Convention, supra,note 343, art. 4(4).
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Recoverable damages include both direct and consequential
losses.3 49 Unless damages have resulted from the shipowner's wilful
misconduct, both the shipowner and guarantor are indemnified for the
total amount of liability in excess of $165 (100 SDRS) per ton of ship's
tonnage or $13 million (8 million SDRS), whichever is less,3 5 0 to a
maximum of $219 (133 SDRS) per ton or $23 million (14 million SDRS),
whichever is less.3 51
The Fund Convention is financed on levies imposed on oil
companies receiving over 150,000 tons of "contributing oil" annually3 52
The ioic fund is unusual in that it is inexhaustible; rather than being
merely a dormant fund, into which payments are made in advance,
annual payments by cargo owners are contributed in the following year
and are adjusted as claims demand 53 Under both the cLc and the Fund
Convention, the total amount of compensation available to claimants was
set at approximately $49 million (30 million SDRS) per incident, with a
proviso for increasing this amount to $99 million (60 million SDRS)
should experience demonstrate the need to do so 3 54 Indeed, the limit
has been increased to 60 million SDRS. 5 5
The cLc entered into force on 19 June 1975,356 while the Fund

Convention entered into force on 16 October 1978. The 1976 Protocols
to both, which replaced the unit of account from gold francs to the more
appropriate Special Drawing Rights, entered into force in April 1981. 57
Canada did not ratify either Convention until 24 April 1989-a full
twenty years after the inception of the cLc and more than a dozen years
349 Under article 4(1), compensation is provided to victims of "pollution damage" as defined
under the CLC. Ibid. art. 1(2). By reference, then, the Fund is liable for the costs of "loss or
damage caused outside the ship ... and includes the costs of preventive measures and further loss or
damage caused by preventive measures." CLC supra, note 334, art. 1(6). Further, "'preventive
measures' means any reasonable measures taken by any person after an incident has occurred to
prevent or minimise pollution damage." CLC, ibid art. 1(7).
35 0
Fund Convention, supra,note 343, art. 5(1)(a).
351 Ibid art. 5(1)(b).
352
35

1id art. 10. Article 1(3) defines "contributing oil" as being either crude or fuel oils.

3 IML art. 12.

354 Ibi. art. 4(6).
355
IbiL art. 4(4).
356
35 7

Status ofMultilateralConventions, supra, note 68 at 199 and 245.
id. at 217 and 253.
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since the CLC had begun operating to provide pollution compensation to
victim states on the international level. The u.s. is still not party to either
Convention.
4. The 1984 Protocols
By the late 1970s, it had become apparent that the liability limits
of the CLC and the Fund Convention were far too low, a fact which was
dramatically highlighted by the Amoco Cadiz disaster in 1978. As a
result, the international community responded by critically reviewing
existing legislation through IMO's Legal Committee. In May 1984, the
IMO convened a diplomatic conference, which led to the adoption of
Protocols to both the 1969 and 1971 Conventions.358 The Protocols
altered the existing regime by both broadening the scope of application
and substantially raising the liability limits of the 1969 and 1971
Conventions.
The scope of application was expanded in several ways. The
definition of "ship" was broadened to include, not only ships carrying oil
in bulk as cargo, but also any vessel constructed or adapted to do so
"when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage
following such carriage."35 9 Thus, spills resulting from the oily slops or
residues of unladen tankers or combination carriers are also covered
under the Protocols.3 60 Similarly, the definition of oil has been broadened to include "any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil ... whether
carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship."361
"Incident" under article 1(8) of the 1969 CLC is redefined as
being "any occurrence, or series of occurrences having the same origin,
which causes pollution damage or creates a grave and imminent threat of

358 Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage, 25 May 1984, reprinted in 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 613 [hereinafter CLC Protocol]
and Protocol of 1984 to Amend the International Convention for the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 25 May 1984, reprinted in 15 J.
Mar. L & Com. 623 [hereinafter Fund Protocol].
359

CLCProtoco4 ibid. art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
360 Note that all definitions set out under the CLC Protocol are, by reference, the same as
those of the FundProtocol supra, note 358, art. 2(3).
361
CLCProtoco4 supra, note 358, art. 2(2) (emphasis added).
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causing such damage."362 Hence, the Protocoladditionally provides for
the amelioration of pre-spill threats.
The definition of "pollution damage" has been clarified substantially under the cLc Protocol,3 63 so that a distinction is made between
damage to the environmentper se and economic loss resulting from such
damage. Previously, decisions on the extent to which claims can be
made for "pure economic loss"364 have been left up to the national
courts of individual states 3 65 Under the Protocols, recovery for loss of
profit to such persons as hoteliers and restaurateurs is now allowed.
However, whereas the admissibility of claims for natural resource
damage was also formerly left up to the jurisprudence of national courts,
non-quantifiable costs of pollution damage are now expressedly not
recoverable. In this sense, the new definition may be construed as being
more restrictive than before. However, the CLC Protocol does allow for
recovery of costs "of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually
undertaken or to be undertaken."3 66

362

bid art. 2(4) (emphasis added).

363 Under the Protocols,"pollution damage" is defined as follows: "a loss or damage caused
outside the ship by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship,
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the
environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable
measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken." Ibid. art 2(3). The 1969
definition was more general, describing pollution damage as "loss or damage caused outside the
ship carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship,
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, and includes the costs of preventive measures and
further loss of damage caused by preventive measures." Ibid art. 1(6).
364 "Pure economic loss" may be described as economic loss suffered by persons "as a result
of oil pollution, without any damage being caused to their property." See M. Jacobsson, "The
Notion of 'Pollution Damage,' with Particular Regard to Damage to the Marine Environment" in
Proceedings-1987Oil Spill Conference: Prevention Behavior, Control and Cleanup (Washington,
D.C.: American Petroleum Institute, 1987) 555 at 556.
365 For a brief account of the Fund's policy concerning the admissibility of claims, see
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, Annual Report 1988 (London: International Oil
Pollution Compensation Fund, 1988) at 57-62.
366 Supra, note 358. For further discussion, see also M. Jacobsson & N. Trotz, "The
Definition of Pollution Damage in the 1984 Protocols to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the
1971 Fund Conventions" (1986) 17:4 . Mar. L. & Com. 467. For an account of Canada's position
regarding the development of the new definition during the deliberations of the IMO Legal
Committee, including Canada's desire to restrict speculative claims, see D. Silverstone, "Ship
Source Oil Pollution Damage: A Canadian Perspective on Recoverability of Economic Losses and
Damage to the Marine Environment" (1985) 9:2 Marine Policy 108.
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The geographical scope of application is also widened under the
1984 Protocols. Whereas the 1969 CLC provides for recovery of oil
pollution damages sustained only within a state's territorial sea,3 67 the
CLC Protocol additionally provides for pollution damage caused within a
state's 200 mile "Exclusive Economic Zone."3 68
The most important provisions of the 1984 Protocols concern the
limits of liability, which are raised considerably. Under article 6(1) of
the CLC Protocol,limits are set at approximately $4.9 million (3 million
SDRS) for a ship of 5,000 units of tonnage or less. For larger ships, limits
are raised an additional $691 (420 SDRS) for each additional tonne, to a
maximum of $98 million (59.7 million SDRs). 3 69 Article 6(3) of the Fund
Protocolraises the limits much further and is implemented in two stages.
First, the Fund Convention provides for a maximum level of compensation of 135 million SDRs, resulting in a combined total of approximately
$222 million. This limit will be raised even further to a maximum of
$329 million (200 million SDRS) with respect to any one incident,
when there are three Parties to this Convention in respect of which the combined
such Parties,
relevant quantity of contributing oil received by persons in the territories of
3 70
during the preceding calender year, equalled or exceeded 600 million tons.

Once this second stage is reached, the total amount recoverable
under the two Protocols would be approximately $329 million-over
three times the limit currently available. Moreover, the Protocols
provide for a more expedient means of revising these limits, should this
37 1
be deemed necessary inthe future.
However, while the limits may be much higher and more easily
revised, the six years of negotiations leading to the drafting of the
36 7

CLC; supra,note 334, art. I(a).

368
CLC Protoco4 supra, note 358, art. 3(a)(ii). Note that, again, this provision is identical for
the FundProtoco4 supra, note 358, art. 4.
369 As with the CLC and Fund Convention, the "unit of account" is established as the Special
Drawing Right (SDR) as defined by the International Monetary Fund. CLC Protocot ibid. art.
6(9)(a).
3 70
Fund Protoco4 supra, note 358, art. 6(3).

371 Under article XVIII of the 1969 CLC, supra, note 334, limits of liability could only be

altered by means of a full scale Diplomatic Conference. However, under the CLC Protoco any
proposals to amend the limits may be circulated among all states party to the Protocol and then
submitted to the Legal Committee of the IMO, which can then vote on the amendment, subject to
certain conditions. CLC Protoco4 supra, note 358, art. 15(1)-(6).

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL- 30 NO. 1

Protocols also resulted in a significant compromise regarding the
shipowner's limit of liability. Whereas the CLC provides for strict liability,372 the cLcProtocol reverses this legal achievement and actually
reimposes only a fault based burden of intentional or reckless
negligence:
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is proved
that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would
probably result. 73

The effect of this provision is to render a shipowner's limit of liability
virtually unbreakable. As Abecassis and Jarashaw note,
the concept is close to, but not identical with, the English law concept of wilful
misconduct, which governs the question of when the assured's conduct invalidates the
insurance contract. Since most Protection and Indemnity policies insuring oil pollution
damage under the Convention are governed by English law, in most cases the cover will
be intact when there is a right to limit, and the cover will fail if the right to limit is broken:
this alone may discourage victims from
attempting to challenge in court the owner's right
3 74
to limit under these new provisions.

That the 1984 Protocols would provide for virtually unbreakable limits of
liability for shipowners has been particularly problematic for Canada's
acceptance of the Protocols. The Federal Internal Review notes:
This in itself would not be of great importance provided that the limits of the revised
Fund convention were sufficiently high. While the majority of spills would probably fall
within the limits described earlier, recent events (EXXON Valdez) show that the revised
limits of the Fund would not be sufficient in the case of mega spills. Consequently, there
would be insufficient funds available for compensation in such cases should it not be
75
possible to break limitation?

The Public Review Panel echoes these concerns, observing that
"one must be cognizant of the implicit tradeoff" imposed by "making the
limitation of liability substantially unbreakable." 376 Both reviews con-

372 CLC,supra, note 334, art. V(2).
3 73
374

CLCProtoco4 supra, note 358, art. 6(2).

Abecassis et aL, supra, note 36 at para. 10-148.
375 Federal Internal Review, "Liability and Compensation for Damages Caused by Ship
Source Pollution: #4 Background Paper Re: 1984 Protocols to the Civil Liability Convention and
Fund Convention" (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished].
376
ProtectingOur Waters,supra, note 4 at 84.
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eluded that Canada should not become party to the Protocols until the
higher limits of compensation provided by the second stage of the CLC
Protocol become effective, at which point "Canada's pro rata share of
clean-up and damage expenses would be far less because the expenses
will be shared by more states, including most of the world's large oil
3
importers."s 77
The Protocols to the CLC and the Fund Convention are not yet in
force, as they lack the requisite number of signatories. The CLC Protocol
will enter into force twelve months following the date on which ten states
have become party to the Convention, six of which have not less than one
million units of gross tanker tonnage.378 The Fund Protocolwill enter
into force after at least eight states, whose total receipt of oil during the
preceding year has been at least six hundred million tons of contributing
oil, have become party to the Convention 379 No state may sign the Fund
Protocolwithout first having ratified, accepted, approved, or acceded to
the CLC Protocol.380 Further, the Fund Protocolwill not enter into force
prior to the CLC ProtocoL381

To date, there are only six contracting states to the CLC
Protocol,382 and only two, Germany and France, are party to the Fund
Protocol.383 As it currently stands, it is unlikely that they will enter into
force in the foreseeable future. This is due primarily to the fact that the
federal Oil PollutionAct of 1990,384 which was signed by President Bush
on 18 August 1990, effectively precludes u.s. ratification of the Protocols
at the current timei 85 Without the membership of the u.s., the other
377/bid.
3 78

CLCProtoco) supra, note 358, art. 13(1).

3 79

FundProtoco;supra, note 358, art. 30(1)(a)-(b).

380

/bid art. 28(4).

381 Ibd art. 30(2).
382

Status ofMultinationalConventions, supra,note 68 at 230.

383 iid.at 262.
384 For a text of the Act, see House of Representatives, Conference Report to accompany
H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S.
House of Representatives, Release, "After 15 Years, Massive Oil Spill Law is Signed" (19 August

1990).
385

In an earlier draft, provisions under sections 3001-8 of Title III of the House Bill, entitled

"Implementation of International Conventions," provided for the implementation of the 1984
Protocols. See Oil Pollution and Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Coast
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leading oil importing nations-in particular, Japan and Italy-are
unlikely to ratify the Protocols,rendering virtually impossible the ability
to satisfy the provisions required to allow the Protocols to enter into
force. Currently, members of the IMO, including Canada, are deliberating over alternative mechanisms to "trigger" the entry into force of
the 1984 Protocols38 6
Clearly, the 1984 Protocols offer substantial benefits to those
states which are party to them, most notably in the vastly increased
liability and compensation limits. As well, the increased geographical
scope of application and broader definitions, among other things, offer a
strengthened regime of compensation. The provision for shipowner's
liability is, however, a reversal of the trend in recent years towards
stricter liability. Moreover, the "unbreakable" shipowner's liability limit
is extremely problematic. A monumentally wealthy corporation, such as
Exxon, could well limit its liability to an amount representing only a
fraction of the total costs of a massive spill and clean out the Fund
Convention almost before the oil had hit the beaches. The u.s. federal
position on not ratifying the Protocolsuntil the second stage of compensation is reached is reasonable in this light. As the legislation now
stands, compromises will be impossible to avoid, but the potential pay
offs would, at least, be far greater. Of course, if every state waits for the
second stage to be implemented before ratifying the Protocols, the
second stage will never come into effect.
B. NationalLaw
Twenty years ago, the Canadian government was prompted to
substantially revise the Canada Shipping Act, when both the Torrey
Canyon disaster in 1967 and the Arrow spill off the coast of Nova Scotia
in 1970 brought the issue of ship source oil pollution dramatically home
Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) at 63. However, in the final draft of
the OilPollutionAct of1990, these provisions were deleted and replaced with the following:

It is the sense of the Congress that it is in the best interests of the United States to participate
in an international oil pollution liability and compensation regime that is at least as effective as
Federal and State laws in preventing incidents and in guaranteeing full and prompt
compensation for damages resulting from incidents.
Oil Pollutionand CompensationAct of 1990: Conference Report, ibid. s. 3001.
386 Personal communication with A. Popp, Department of Justice (Ottawa, 9 November
1990).
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to Canadians. As noted earlier, the latter incident occurred in the midst
of a veritable legal vacuum. 387 Indeed, as one federal official notes, both
the Torrey Canyon andArrow spills were similar in several respects:
Many of the same problems that faced the British and French governments, faced the
Canadian government-no statutory regime of liability, inadequate limits of liability,

jurisdiction, how to bring an action against those responsible for a foreign owned,
registered and operated ship.3 8 8

Consequently, Part XX of the Canada Shipping Act was
created, 389 containing provisions for liability and compensation for oil
pollution damage for the first time. In 1970, following the voyage of the
Manhattan through the Northwest Passage, the Arctic Waters Pollution
PreventionAct 390 was also drafted. For the purposes of this review, only
the CanadaShippingAct will be examined, due to its general application
to all Canadian waters south of the sixtieth parallel.
Briefly, Part XX applied to all Canadian waters south of the
sixtieth parallel, including all fishing zones and all waters north of the
sixtieth parallel which were not contained within a 100 mile shipping
safety control zone made pursuant to the Arctic Water Pollution
PreventionAct.3 91 It established a framework of strict liability with
narrow defences. 392 Liability limits were set at 2,000 gold francs (about
$219 at current rates) per ton of ship's tonnage or 210 million gold
francs ($23 million), whichever was less.39 3 Moreover, the liability provi38 7

For further discussion, seeReport ofthe Royal Commission, supra, note 161.

388

A. Popp, "State Responsibility and the Environment (With Specific Reference to Liability
and Compensation for Oil Pollution Caused by Ship)" in Proceedingsof the 1989 Conference of the
CanadianCouncil on InternationalLaw: Preservingthe Environment (Ottawa: Canadian Council on
International Law, 1989) 142 at 160 n. 37.
389 S.C 1970-71-72, c. 27.

390 S.C. 1969-70, c. 47. The Act was drafted as much to establish jurisdictional control over
arctic waters as it was to protect the arctic marine ecosystem. For further discussion on the
background of theAct, see M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra,note 160. In brief, the Act created a regime

of absolute liability (s. 7(1)), imposed upon the owners of both the ship and its cargo (s. 6(1)).
Further, the Act applies to all pollutants; its provisions are not restricted to oil pollution (s. 2).
Finally, it applies north of the sixtieth parallel (s. 3).
391 CanadaShippingAct, R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c. 27, s. 727(2) [hereinafter CSA (1970)].
392 These include situations where the discharge was caused by the claimant, an act of war, an

act or omission done by a third person with the intent to cause damage, and government negligence
in the installation or maintenance of navigational aids. bid. s. 735(1).
393

Ibid. s. 735(4).
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sions contained within Part XX applied to both the shipowner and the
owner of the cargo,394 and both were required to provide evidence
demonstrating financial responsibility up to the prescribed liability
limits. 395 Section 736(2) also provided for direct action against the
insurers.
The provisions of Part XX applied to all pollutants, not just
"persistent oil."396 Also, the liability provisions of the Act applied to
pollutants "in bulk, '397 but the supporting regulations suggest the
pollutant need not be carried only as cargo 398
The Maritime Pollution Claims Fund (lmpc) was also established
under Part XX 399 and was made up of payments levied on each ton of
bulk oil cargo transported within Canadian waters.4°° This levy was only
collected between 1972 and 1975, at which time it stood at approximately
$39 million.401 Further payments into the fund were then deemed to be
unnecessary by the Minister of Transportation, as the amount was
considered sufficiently high, and the MwCF had thus far been little
used.4 02 At the time of the Nestucca incident, the virtually unused fund
had increased in value to approximately $140 million.
C. The CanadianRegime and InternationalLaw: Pre-1989
Part XX of the Canada Shipping Act shared several similarities
with the international regime in force at the time, namely, the Civil
Liability Convention (c=c). For one, both regimes established a

394 Ibid. s. 734(1). In this respect, they were similar to section 6(1) of the Arctic Waters
PollutionPreventionAct, supra, note 390.
395

CSA (1970), ibid. s. 736.
396Ibid. s. 727. "Oil" is defined as "oil of any kind or in any form."
397

Ibici
s. 734(1).

398 Popp, supra, note 388 at 161. Popp refers to the Maritime Pollution Claims Fund
Regulations, CR.C. 1978, c. 1444.
399 CSA (1970), supra,note 391, s. 737.
4001bid.s.748(1).
401

ProtectingOur Waters, supra,note 4 at 87.

402 Personal communication with A. Popp, Department of Justice (Ottawa, 9 November
1990).
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framework of strict liability, with similar defences. °3 The liability limits
of the two pieces of legislation were also identical, 404 and both regimes
established pollution compensation funds.
The differences between international law and the Canada
ShippingAct were nonetheless significant. For one, the scope of application of each was substantially different. While Part XX of the Canada
ShippingAct applied to all Canadian waters, including Canada's 200 mile
fishing zones, the CLC applied only to the territorial sea. Also, unlike the
international regime, application of Part XX was not restricted to
persistent oils. The liability provisions of the Act were also broader,
applying not only to the shipowner, but also to the cargo owner,
providing also for the right of direct action against the insurer.
These discrepancies between Canadian and international law
impeded Canada's accession to the CLC and the Fund Convention. In
fact, Canada had unsuccessfully advocated many of these relatively
"radical" provisions at the CLC negotiations in 1969405 Following both
the Torrey Canyon and Arrow incidents, however, public opinion
favoured assertive environmental initiatives, and Canada was unwilling
to wait for what was often a painfully slow diplomatic process at the
iMco. As a result, Canada unilaterally enacted what appeared to be a
superior environmental regime.
The final product, although a vast improvement over the
previous regime, was far less effective than originally expected. The
provision for direct access to the insurer and for liability to be placed on
the cargo owner were highly contentious. Indeed, Protection and
Indemnity Associations (P&i clubs) refused to provide the necessary
insurance, and the sections were never proclaimed into force.4°
Similarly, while the application of Part XX was not restricted to

403 Defences under both section 735 of the CSA (1970), supra, note 391 and article III(2)-(3)

of the CLC, supra, note 334 included cause by claimant, war, intentional act by a third party, and
government negligence in the maintenance of navigational aids.
404 As noted earlier, both article V(1) of the CLC,ibid and section 735(4) of the CSA (1970),
ibid. set the limits of liability of the shipowner at 2,000 gold francs per ton of the ship's tonnage to a
maximum of 210 million francs.
405 During the negotiations, Canada was prominent among a group of states supporting
liability that would be strict, unlimited, and imposed jointly on both the ship and cargo owners. See

M'Gonigle & Zacher, supra,note 160 at 172-79ff.
4 06

Popp, supra, note 388 at 163.
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persistent oils, the insurance offered by P&i clubs was (and still is) limited
to oils defined as being "persistent. '407
The Maritime Pollution Claims Fund (1vucF), as well, offered
weak protection to Canadians. Although the M'FC and iopc Fund were
similar, the latter provided immediate recourse for acceptable claims.
The domestic fund, by contrast, served as a fund of last resort for
unsatisfied judgement claims. 408 In practice, the MPCF was cumbersome
and complex and so dependent on the use of litigation that it was
virtually unused.
Thus, few claims were submitted to the MPCF, and fewer were
accepted. Between the inception of the fund in 1971 until 1979, only
eight claims were made against it. In all cases, the claimants were
fishermen claiming loss of income due to spill damage under section 746
of the Canada ShippingAct. Only two of these were accepted. The first
claim was for $3200.00 and was settled at $345.90. The second fisherman claimed $1,050.00 and was awarded $300.00.409 A fund with tens of
millions in assets, paid out $645.90.
In 1979, following an oil spill in which the British tanker, the
Kurdistan, dumped 7,130 tons of bunker oil into the Cabot Strait, 190
East Coast fishermen applied to the MPCF again claiming loss of income
under section 746 of the Canada ShippingAct. However, under section
734 of the Act, the polluter was directly responsible for all direct loss and
damage from an oil spill, including damage of fishing gear and
equipment. Consequently, claimants were obligated to direct their individual claims against the owners of the Kurdistan. There was no means
of facilitating this process at the time. 410 In this case, the polluters were
prompt and fair, and litigation on the part of the victims proved to be

407 Federal Internal Review, "Liability and Compensation for Damages Caused By Ship

Source Pollution: Issue 2, P&I Coverage in the Arctic" (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard, 1989)
[unpublished].
408

Popp, supra, note 388 at 161.

409 Letter from K.J. Burbridge, MPCF Administrator, to Ruth Marlyn, Canadian Labour
Congress (28 February 1980) Ottawa [hereinafter Burbridge].
410 The recent amendments to the Canada ShippingAct have altered this substantially. The
renamed "Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund" is now available as the primary means of compensation,
thus facilitating claims for individuals and non-public body claimants. See below, section IV.E at
239.
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unnecessary. 411 The Maritime Pollution Claims Fund was not used
since.
In short, Part XX of the Canada ShippingAct was in practice
impotent. By the late 1970s, Canada was in practice falling far behind
what was available if the country had been covered by the original cLc
and the Fund Convention. There were no substantive revisions concern412
ing the liability and compensation features of the Act for fifteen years.
D. The Nestucca Fiasco
Ironically, Canada finally got around to writing new liability laws
in the mid-1980s, but their tardy proclamation came four months after
the nationally visible Nestucca spill off Vancouver Island in 1989. This
incident provides a useful landmark in examining the evolution of the
law and serves to illustrate the character of the Canadian regime then
and now. A description and analysis of the inadequate state of preparation and flawed efforts to clean up the spill is beyond the scope of this
review. However, some mention of the organizational problems is
warranted, as the issues of adequate preparedness and oil spill response
are so intertwined with that of responsibility and liability.
The spill highlighted fundamental legal difficulties. Response to
the spill was confounded by such logistical problems as lack of preparedness, equipment, and trained personnel and a reluctance of
authorities and clean-up contractors to co-operate effectively with local
volunteers.4 3 It also spotlighted the ambiguous legal obligation of the
Minister of Transport. Despite having the authority to intervene in the
event of such spills, 414 neither the polluter nor the Minister were
take preventive or mitigative action, and neither did for
obligated to 415
days.
several
411 Burbridge, supra, note 409.
412 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 90.
413 For a critical discussion of the inadequate response to the Nestucca spill, see ibid. at 56-60.
414
CanadaShippingAc supra, note 59, s. 661(2)-(3).
415 Under the Canada ShippingAct, the polluter was liable for any costs incurred in mitigating
or preventing pollution damage. The amended Act, however, conforms with the international
regime in that a shipowner may recover costs voluntarily assumed to prevent or reduce pollution
damage. Thus, the shipowner can now undertake clean-up or prevention efforts without
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As a result of this legal ambiguity and organizational inertia, the
clean-up was delayed over concerns about who would pay. The "polluter
pays" principle has long been Coast Guard policy, and the Nestucca
incident proved how this policy could be a real obstacle to prompt and
adequate response. Efforts to confirm that the barge Nestucca was
indeed the source of the oil coating the beaches of western Vancouver
Island took several days. As a result, Sause Brothers, the owner of the
barge, deferred hiring contractors until 5 January, almost two weeks
after the spill had first occurred. The contractors, in turn, hired clean-up
workers one day later. A full-scale response effort, in conjunction with
government agencies, was undertaken only on 10 January.416
These problems were seriously compounded because the spill
was transboundary in nature. At the time, there was no provision for
recovery under the Canada ShippingAct for spills originating in another
jurisdiction and drifting in. Under section 654(2),417 the liability and
compensation provisions of theAct applied only
(a) to all Canadian waters south of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude;
(b) to all Canadian waters north of the sixtieth parallel of north latitude that are not
within a shipping safety control zone prescribed pursuant to the Arctic Waters
PollutionPreventionAct;
(c) to any fishing zones of Canada prescribed pursuant to the TerritorialSea and Fishing
ZonesAct; and
(d) to all ships in waters described in paragraphs (a) to (c).

The Nestucca spill originated beyond Canadian waters.
Consequently, compensation under the Act was unavailable to claimants.
Moreover, as neither the u.s. nor Canada were party to the cC or the
Fund Convention, claimants could seek no recourse through international law. All this was exacerbated by the concern that, even after
expensive and cumbersome cross-border litigation, Canadian victims
might be deprived of full compensation by the century-old American
Limitation of LiabilityAct. 418
jeopardizing his or her ability to maintain costs below his or her limit of liability. Ibid. s. 677(b). For
further discussion, see Federal Internal Review, "Liability and Compensation for Damages Caused
By Ship Source Pollution: #8 Background Paper Re: The Canadian Environmental Protection
Act" (Ottawa: Canadian Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished].
416 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 56.
417

Supra, note 59.
418 46 U.S.C.S. § 183 (Law. Co-op. 1987). See C. Sandborn, "Recommendations for Reform
of the Laws Governing Oil Transportation and Oil Spills" (Brief submitted to the Public Hearing on
Oil Transportation and Oil Spills, 15 June 1989) (Vancouver, B.C.: West Coast Environmental Law
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E. The New CanadianRegime: Post-1989

In the midst of the ensuing legal uncertainty, the fact remained
that Parliament had actually adopted substantial amendments to the

CanadaShipping Act in March 1987; the new regime was simply awaiting
proclamation. Finally, on 24 April 1989, the third supplement of the
Revised Statutes of Canada, 1985, was proclaimed into force. The

provisions of Part XX were repealed and replaced with the new parts:
Part XV, entitled "Pollution Prevention and Control," and Part XVI,
entitled "Civil Liability and Compensation for Pollution." The new
amendments allowed for the ratification of much of the international
regime, most notably MARPOL 73/78, the cLc, and the Fund Convention.
The liability provisions of Part XVI of the Act generally mirror
those of the prevailing international framework. For example, the
geographical scope of application of Part XVI has been broadened to
include pollution damage which may occur
a) in any place in Canada,
b) in Canadian waters, and
c) in any fishing zone pursuant to the TerritorialSea andFishingZones Act, except where
the Arctic Waters Pollution PreventionAct applies, irrespective of the location of the
and irrespective of the Location where any preventive
discharge
actual or expected 41
9
measures are taken.

This provision is significant in cases where marine pollution originates in
another jurisdiction, such as occurred with the Nestucca incident.
The shipowner's limit of liability is now approximately $219 per
ton or $23 million, whichever is less. 420 Liability continues to be strict,
subject to certain defences virtually identical to those of the CLC.421 As
Association) at 11. American legislation is discussed below, section IV.F at 245. As it turned out,
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon found Sause Bros., owners of the barge towing the
Nestucca, "had privity and knowledge of the negligent acts that caused the casualty" and were
therefore ineligible for limitation of liability under theAct. See In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 769
F. Supp. 1147 (D. Or. 1991)
419
Canada ShippingAct, supra, note 59.
420 Ibid. s. 679(a)-(b). Liability provisions of the Act are now measured in Special Drawing
Rights, with the limit of liability actually set at the lesser of 133 SDRs per tonne or 14 million SDRs
in total.
421 These include "an act of war"; "a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and
irresistible character"; "an act or omission of a third party with intent to cause damage"; "the
negligence or wrongful act of any government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of
lights or other navigational aids, in the exercise of that function"; or damage resulting due to the
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with the international regime, a shipowner may be compensated for any
costs voluntarily incurred to prevent or minimize oil spill damage.422
Further, a tanker owner is not entitled to limit his or her liability without
first establishing a "Convention ship owner's fund" 423 in an amount
equal to the limit of that owner's liability.424 In addition, the claimant
has direct access to shipowner's guarantor or insurer, with respect to

laden oil tankers.425

The Maritime Pollution Claims Fund has now been renamed the
Ship-Source Oil Pollution Fund (SSOPF). 426 As was the case with its
predecessor, payments into the fund are based on a levy on each tonne
of oil cargo transported within Canadian waters. 427 The levy, however,
has been increased from 15 cents to 30 cents per tonne,428 to be adjusted
according to the Consumer Price Index in the following fiscal years
thereafter. 429 However, the Minister of Transport has not yet imposed
the levy. 430 Currently, the fund stands at approximately $163 million,431
and payments into the international fund are made through it.432
The SSOPF is now designed to supplement compensation received
under the CLc and Fund Convention.433 However, the Canadian fund
intent or negligence of the claimant. Ibi. s. 677(3)-(4).
422 Ibid. s. 677(6).
423 "Convention ship" refers simply to "a sea-going ship, wherever registered, carrying, in bulk
as cargo, crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil, whale oil or any other persistent oil."
Ibid. s. 673.
4241"bid. s. 682.
425 Ibid. s. 686.
426 IN&. s. 702.
427bid. s. 716.
42 8

Ibid. s. 717(1).

429 Ibid.s. 717(2)-(3).
430 In response to the final report of the Public Review Panel, Transport Canada recently
announced that recommendations concerning the reinstatement of the levy "will be examined." See
Transport Canada,supra, note 11.
431 ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 13.
432

CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59, s. 701(1). Payments are made through the SSOPF in
accordance with articles 10,11, and 12 of the Fund Convention, supra, note 343.
433 Specifically, the SSOPF is liable when "all reasonable steps have been taken to recover
payment" from the shipowner or IOPC Fund; when neither the shipowner nor the Fund are liable;
when the claim exceeds the maximum liability of the shipowner, and the excess is not recoverable
under the Fund; or when the shipowner has insufficient funds to fulfil his or her legal obligations,
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may also provide compensation for "mystery" spills from unknown
sources 43 4 and for spills caused by ships other than laden tankers.

A particularly significant new provision is that the Canadian fund
is now available as a primary source of compensation for individual or
public body claimants, so that victims may now seek compensation
435 The fund admininitially from the SSOPF, rather than the shipowner.
istrator is obliged to investigate and assess the claim and to "make an
offer of compensation to the claimant for whatever portion of the claim
the Administrator finds to be established. '436 The administrator may
then "take all reasonable measures to recover the amount of his
payment to the claimant from the owner of the ship, the International
Fund or any other person liable."43 7 Thus, victims of oil pollution
damage are spared the ordeal of potentially costly and time consuming
litigation with the shipowner. This facilitative role, if actively advanced,
is a major improvement for oil pollution victims.
The maximum amount of compensation available from the SSOPF
is currently set at $100 million.438 The funds are now available to compensate for loss of income, itself broadened considerably to include not
only fishermen, 439 but fish farmers and other mariculturalists, as well as
those practicing subsistence hunting and fishing, and even subsequent
fish plant workers. 440
Two other changes reflect provisions of the cC. First, the cargo
owner is no longer liable for oil pollution damages. To accord itself with
the larger oil trading world, liability is now restricted to the shipowner

and the Fund is not liable for those obligations. CanadaShippingAcq ibid. s. 709(a)-(d).

Ibid. s. 709(f). In such cases, it is the responsibility of the SSOPF administrator to prove
causing the damage was not caused by a ship.
that the spill
434

435/Ibid, s. 710.
436 Ibid. s. 710(2)(b).
437bid s. 711(3)(c).
438 Ibid. s. 714(1)(a). This figure is to be adjusted annually according to components of the
Consumer Price Index. bid. s. 714(2).
439 Prior to the entry into force of the third supplement, the Canada ShippingAct provided
compensation only for the loss of income by fishermen. See CanadaShippingAct, R.S.C. c. S-9, s.
675(1).
440

Ibk. s. 712(1).
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only. 441 Second, Part XVI applies solely to damage caused by oil
polution.442
With the entry into force of the new Canada Shipping Act
amendments in 1989, Canada once more joined ranks with the international shipping community with regard to liability and compensation.
The higher limits of liability, and potential compensation afforded by
ratifying the CLC and the Fund Convention, as well as the more streamlined process offered by the ioPc Fund settlement procedures, clearly
offer greater protection to Canadians. As well, the Canadian regime on
its own offers many improvements to previous domestic legislation.
Moreover, unenforceable provisions in the legislation have been
removed.
Nonetheless, the new regime under the amended Act is far from
perfect. For one thing, the scope of application of the Act has been
reduced. Whereas its provisions formerly applied to all pollutants, they
are now, in accordance with the CLC, limited to oil pollution. In fact,
Canada has no statutory framework whereby non-public bodies can be
compensated for damages resulting from hazardous and noxious
substances. 443 This is a very serious problem in the law. For another,
the regime does not go far enough. There are several instances where
this is the case. For example, neither the CLC nor the Act apply to oil
other than that carried in bulk. In other words, spills from ships' fuel or
from non-tanker ships in ballast are still not covered under the new
regime. Yet, the pollution caused by such vessels can be substantial. As
discussed earlier, ratification of the Protocols,if in force, would remedy
this.
As well, admissible claims for loss of income are still very
restricted. TheAct fails to allow recovery for loss of income for those in
tourism and related industries; although, in practice, the iopc Fund
administrator has allowed for recovery of claims of restaurateurs and
hoteliers, so long as the damages are quantifiable. 444 This has occurred
441bmid. s. 677(1).
442 Ibid.
443 Federal Internal Review, "Liability and Compensation for Damages Caused By Ship

Source Pollution: Issue 1, Application of CLC and fund to Fishing Zones" (Ottawa: Canadian
Coast Guard, 1989) [unpublished].
444 For a summary of IOPC Fund settlement policies over the years, see Annual Report 1988,
supra,note 365 at 57-62.
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because of the ambiguous definition of "pollution damage" in the
Convention. In Canadian legislation, however, allowable claims are
more explicitly-and restrictively-set out.
In another respect, the definition of pollution damage under Part
XVI is more restrictive than that of the cLc and the Fund Convention.
Whereas the international regime renders the shipowner liable for oil
pollution damage, 445 defined as including "any reasonable measures
taken by any person after an incident has occurred to prevent or
minimise pollution damage," 446 the Act provides for shipowner liability
only for such measures undertaken by a public authority.447 As the
Public Review Panel points out, this explicitly excludes costs incurred by
volunteers undertaking clean-up efforts. 448 Yet, if anything should have
been learned from the Nestucca incident, it was the absolutely critical
role which local volunteers play in such events, both in terms of
enormous physical labour, and essential knowledge of the local
environment.
Moreover, pollution damage to the natural environment is
neglected under both domestic and international compensation
provisions. 449 As noted above, the definition of pollution damage under
the cLc and the Fund Convention is vague. Explicit interpretation of the
term is left up to individual states to define domestically on a
court-by-court basis. In Canada's case, the issue is viewed
restrictively.45 0 As the Public Review Panel notes, "shipowners, government agencies, the oil industry and others in Canada have continued to
consider clean-up costs and damage to property without giving any
thought to compensation for social, economic or environmental
damage." 451 This approach flies in the face of a large and growing body

445 CLC, supra, note 334, art. 111(1).
446 bid art. 1(7) (emphasis added).

447 CanadaShippingAct, supra, note 59, s.677(1)-(2).
448

ProtectingOur Waters,supra, note 4 at 97.

449 This issue has been discussed briefly in the context of the 1984 Protocols. See above,

section IV.A.4 at 227.
450 Indeed, at the negotiations for the 1984 Protocols, Canadian delegates were among those
advocating a restricted definition of pollution damage in order to reduce speculative claims to the
greatest extent possible. See Silverstone, supra, note 366.
451 ProtectingOur Waters,supra, note 4 at 98.
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of literature and an expanding range of judicial and statutory recognition
of compensable environmental damage per se (assessed, for example, as
the cost of restoration) independent of individual property damage or
quantifiable loss. 452 Canada might do well to look to the u.s. Oil
PollutionAct of 1990 for guidance on this issue.45 3
Sadly, but perhaps to have been expected, the aggregate amount
of compensation available under both the SSOPF and the iOpC fund,
approximately $200 million, is still totally inadequate for spills of significant magnitude. By contrast, recent u.s. legislation establishes a fund
with a limit of up to $1 billion (u.s.). 454
At a broad national level, the larger composite statutory
framework for oil pollution liability in Canada is inconsistent.
Numerous gaps and overlaps exist with other domestic legislation,
including the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 455 the Fisheries
Act,456 the CanadianEnvironmentalProtectionAct,457 and others. Each
offers differing defences, penalties, and scope of application. As the
Public Review Panel notes, "the overall body of legislation lacks
uniformity and consistency." 458
Internationally, deficiencies with the CLC and the Fund Convention limit their effectiveness for Canada. As discussed above, the international regime only applies to the territorial sea (not the 200 mile
452 See, for example, F.B. Cross, "Natural Resource Damage Valuation" (1989) 42 Vand. L.

R. 269; F. Halter & J.T. Thomas, "Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and Wildlife Losses
Caused by Pollution" (1982) 10 Ecology L.Q. 5 at 7; and R. Carson & P. Navarro, "Fundamental
Issues in Natural Resource Damage Assessment" (1988) 28 Nat. Resources J. 815. See, especially,

the Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Damagesfor EnvironmentalHarm (Toronto:
Ontario Law Reform Commission, 15 January 1990). See also State of Ohio v. U.S. Departmentof
the Interior,880 F. 2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989) and OntarioEnvironmentalProtectionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c.
141, s. 81.
453

See below, section IV.F at 245.

454 Section 9001(c)(1) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, supra, note 384 amends section
9509(c)(2) of the InternalRevenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C.S. § 9509 (Law. Co-op. 1988), which
establishes the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund by raising the total amount recoverable under the Fund
for expenditures per incident to $1 billion (U.S.).
455

Supra, note 151.

45 6

Supra, note 152.
Supra, note 154.
458ProtectingOur Waters, supra, note 4 at 90. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the
45 7

scope of this report. For further discussion, see "Gaps and Overlaps," supra,note 155.
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fishing zones) and is limited to persistent oils.459 And with the u.s. not
being a party to either the CLC or the Fund Convention, the resolution of
claims for transboundary oil pollution may remain problematic. A
Canadian official involved in the adminstration of the legislation points
out that a polluting ship may remain in u.s. jurisdiction and may not be
insured to the limits required by the cC. Further, in order to receive
compensation from the iopc Fund, the claimant must first demonstrate
that they were unable to obtain full compensation from the
shipowner.460 Thus, Canadian claimants might first have to seek
recompense in u.s. courts "to satisfy the requirement of the Fund
Convention that all reasonable steps to pursue available legal remedies
have been taken." 461 If this should be the case, it may be that the
Conventions have found only partial application in North American
waters. As Popp observes, "in many respects, Canada and the United
States face the same situation as the British and French governments
faced at the time of the Torrey Canyon incident." 462
F. The New American Regime
With one of the world's largest maritime states located directly
south of Canada's borders, the issue of liability and compensation for
pollution damage arising from u.s. vessels is of obvious concern to
Canadians. Two potential problems may arise from pollution from u.s.
vessels in Canadian or international waters and from transboundary
pollution originating directly from American waters. Prior to April
1989, the Canada Shipping Act contained no provision for the latter
scenario.
Before 1990, no comprehensive federal legislation was in place in
the u.s. which promptly and adequately compensated those who suffered
459

The definition of "oil" under article 1(5) of the CLC, supra, note 334 is as follows: "any
persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, lubricating oil and whale oil, whether
carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship." This definition is far from being
explicitly clear. In practice, damages from spills of gasoline, automotive diesel,. No. 2 fuel oil, and
kerosene are not recoverable under the Fund Convention, supra, note 343. See also Abecassis et at,
supra, note 36 at para.s 10-10-10-13.

460 Fund Convention, ibid. art. 4(1).
461 Popp, supra, note 388 at 167.
462 Ibid. at 168.
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economic loss due to oil pollution damage, other than government costs
for clean-up and removal. Neither the Nixon nor the Ford administrations implemented either the cLc or the Fund Convention, as
government critics contended that the limits established under each
were far too low, a position supported by the environmental community.463 Instead, a byzantine domestic regime existed. As one critic
described it, there was "a fragmented hodge podge of national and state
laws providing inadequate cleanup and damage remedies, taxpayer
subsidies to cover cleanup costs, damages that go uncompensated,
corporate structures designed to limit exposure, and other legal barriers
to victim recoveries." 464
Attempts to draft comprehensive oil pollution and compensation
legislation for the u.s. were ongoing for over fifteen years 465 Finally, on
18 August 1990, as images of yet another prodding disaster, this time the
Excon Valdez, were just beginning to fade from the public consciousness,
the long awaited Oil PollutionAct of 1990466 became law.
At the time of the Nestucca spill, however, no such comprehensive u.s. legislation existed, nor was the u.s. party to the CLC or the
Fund Convention. Nonetheless, in cases of transboundary oil pollution
or pollution from American vessels travelling in or adjacent to Canadian
waters, certain u.s. legislation was potentially applicable.
One u.s. law which provides a particular impediment to the just
settlement of pollution damage claims is the 1851 Limitation of Liability
Act. 46 7 The Act was passed in 1851 to ensure protection to the nascent
American shipping industry. Remarkably, this Act can still be called
upon for incidents in which oil spill damages have occurred without the
shipowner's "privity or knowledge" of the negligence causing the

463

Oil Pollution and Compensation: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and

Navigation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 11 May
1989 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) at 205 (statement of Clifton
Curtis on behalf of the Oceanic Society, Environmental Policy Institute, and Friends of the Earth)
[hereinafter Curtis].

464 Ibid. at 201. In particular, these laws were characterized as having burdens of proof that
favoured the spiller.
465 For a brief description of these efforts, see Report: Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal,

Liability and CompensationAct of 1989, 101st Cong., 1st. Sess. (18 September 1989) at 32-34.
466 Oil PollutionAct of 1990, supra,note 384.
46 7

Supra, note 418.
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damage 468 In such cases, liability cannot exceed the value of the shipowner's interest in the vessel and in any earned freight, as assessed after
the incident has occurred. 469 The owners and time charterers of the
Torrey Canyon unsuccessfully sought to utilize the Act. Had their
attempt been successful, this would have limited their liability to $50.00
actual damages
(u.s.)-the cost of the lone surviving lifeboat. Instead,
470
(u.s.).
million
were assessed at approximately $7.7
Clearly, the anachronistic Act can, and does, work to the
disadvantage of oil spill victims in many cases. Consequently, there is a
judicial tendency to interpret the Act to deny or restrict shipowner's
limitation.4 71 However, as one author comments, "Forcing courts to
remake United States policy by reference to a 137 year old statute has
contributed to the present state of uncertainty in determining liability
472 This uncertainty is true for foreign as
and recovery under U.S. law."
473
well as American claimants.
Only one law, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act
(TApAA), 4 74 specifically applies to Canadian claimants. When the TransAtlantic Pipeline was authorized in 1973, considerable concern existed
over the environmental risks posed by an Alaskan tanker route running
along the West Coast, particularly for Canadians to whom the transport
475 Consequently,
of Alaskan oil posed risks but provided no benefits.
TAPAA provided for compensation to Canadian as well as to American
476
victims of Alaskan oil pollution damage.

468/M4
This is based upon the Supreme Court's first judicial interpretation applied to the liability
provision of the Act in The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 468 at 491-93 (1886).
4 69

470

Juric, supra, note 130 at 305.

471 See B. Van Hanswyk, "The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in United States Law" (1988) 22 Int'l Law. 319 at 332.
4 72
bid at 320.
4 73
TheAct was also applied, though broadly interpreted to favour full recovery on the part of
the claimants in theAmoco Cadiz proceedings. See Van Hanswick, ibid. at 336-37.
474 43 U.S.C.S. §§ 1651 etseq. (Law. Co-op. 1980) [hereinafter TAPAA].

475 Anderson, supra,note 7 at 109.
476 TAAA, supra, note 474, § 1653(c)(1).
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TAPAA covers damages caused by oil discharges from vessels
operating between the pipeline terminals and u.s. ports, including the
loading and unloading of those vessels. 47 7 Vessel owners and operators
are strictly liable with narrow defences. 478 Overall limits of liability are
set at $14 million (u.s.). Owners and operators must provide proof of
financial responsibility before any such vessel is loaded. 479 Damages are
recoverable, including clean-up costs, for public or private persons or
entities.48 0 As with the Canada Shipping Act, such damages were
restricted to claims for direct economic and subsistence losses.
For damages exceeding the $14 million (u.s.) maximum liability
of the vessel owner, additional compensation may be provided by the
Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Fund. The fund has an overall limit of $100
million (u.s.) per incident. 48 1 However, damages exceeding the liability
of the fund may be compensated through other applicable federal or
state laws, if these are not pre-empted. 482 Until the Exxon spill, TAPAA
was considered to be the most powerful federal law dealing with liability
and compensation in the United States, 483 and it was the most relevant
for the Canadian West Coast.
With the new environmental regime provided under the Oil
PollutionAct of 1990, however, TAPAA has been eclipsed. Under the new
legislation, both removal costs and damages are recoverable. Removal
costs include those incurred by both the u.s. federal or state governments
or native bands, as well as "any removal costs incurred by anyperson for
acts taken by the person which are consistent with the National
Contingency Plan."48 4 Thus, compensation is not limited to governmental clean-up costs. More impressive, however, is the broadening of

4 77

bid. §§ 1651-1665.
478 The only two defences allowed are an act of war and negligence on the part of the U.S.
government. Ibid. § 1653(c)(2).
479bid.§ 1653(c)(3).

40/Ibi § 1653(c)(1).
481 Ibid. § 1653(c)(5). Note that these limits have been raised under the Oil PollutionAct of
1990, supra, note 384.
482

483

bid.§ 1653(c)(9).

D.A. Bagwell, "Liability under United States law for spills of oil or chemicals from vessels"

(1987) Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ. 496 at 515.
484Oil PollutionAct of 1990, supra, note 384, § 1002(b)(1)(A).
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the definition of "damages," which is a major triumph for advocates of

environmental protection. First, damages to naturalresources are recov-

erable, including "damages for injury to, destruction of, loss of, or loss of

use of, natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing the
damage." 48 5 Second, any claimant may recover for "loss of profits or
impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of
48 6 Clearly,
real property, personal property, or natural resources."
restaurateurs, hoteliers, and others in the tourist industry can now

potentially recover for damages. By contrast, the Canada ShippingAct

excludes such claimants, while the cLc and the Fund Convention do not

explicitly cover such damages. Damages to real or personal property,
subsistence use, revenues, and public services are also recoverable under
section 1002(b)(2).
48 7 Defences are limited 48
Liability is strict, joint, and several.
489
and do not, in any event, apply with respect to a responsible party who
has failed to report the incident, 490 failed to provide all reasonable co-

operation and assistance, 491 or failed to comply with an official order

concerning damage avoidance. 492 No limit of liability exists for government clean-up costs in connection with Outer Continental Shelf facilities

or vessels.493 Liability limits of the "responsible party" are the greater of
$1,200 (u.s.) per gross ton, or $10,000,000 (u.s.) for vessels exceeding
3,000 gross tons, or $2,000,000 (u.s.) for smaller vessels. The u.s.
48 5

Ibid. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
bid. § 1002(b)(2) (E)(emphasis added).

486

487 Under section 1001(17) of the Ac, liability is to be construed to be the standard of liability
established by section 311 of the FederalWater Pollution ControlAct, 33 U.S.C.S. § 1269 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1992) and is thus strict, joint, and several.
488 The defences are an act of God, an act of war, an act or omission of a third party or the
gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the claimant, providing that the responsible party can prove
these were thesole cause of the discharge. OilPollutionAct of1990, supra, note 384, § 1003(a)-(b).
489 "Responsible party," where vessels are concerned, is defined as follows: "In the case of a
vessel, any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel." Ibid. § 1001(32(A)).
490 bid. § 1003(c)(1).
491 Ibid. § 1003(c)(2).
492 The FederalWater Pollution ControlAc supra, note 487, s. 311(c) or (e), as amended by s.
1003(c)(3) of the Oil PollutionAct of 1990, supra, note 384 or by the Intervention on the High Seas
Act 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1471 etseq. (Law. Co-op. 1987).
493 Oil PollutionAct of 1990, ibid. § 1004(c)(3).
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President is required to adjust these limits by regulations which are to be
upgraded every three years to keep up with inflation. 494
Damages to natural resources are recoverable by the u.s.
government, any state government, any native tribe, or for foreign
governments 495 for natural resources under their jurisdiction. 496 In all
cases, the process for presenting claims and recovering damages is
streamlined through the designation of a trustee to act on behalf of the
claimant(s). 497 These trustees are responsible for assessing natural resource damages and developing and implementing a plan for the
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent,
or the natural resources under their trusteeship. 498 One particularly
innovative provision allows for local citizens to seek court action against
federal officials acting in the capacity of public trustees "where there is
alleged to be a failure of that official to perform a duty under this
section that is not discretionary with that official." 499 The measure of
damages to natural resources includes
(a) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the
damaged natural resources;
(b) the diminution in value of those natural resources pending restoration; plus
(c) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages. 5 0 0

These provisions are dramatic and innovative and set a high standard for
future laws on all levels.
Of particular significance to Canadians are the provisions for
recovery by foreign claimants.5 01 In order to recover, foreign claimants
must demonstrate that they have otherwise been unable to recover for
removal costs or damages, and that such recovery is authorized by a
reciprocal agreement or treaty between the claimant's country and the
494M4.§ 1004(d)(4).
495
496
497
498

This applies only in cases where § 1007 applies.
1Wh.§ 1006(a)(1)-(4).
bid § 1006(b)(1).
bi& § 1006(c).

4991id § 1006(g).
500bN § 1006(d)(1).
501 Under § 1007(c), foreign claimants are defined including individual persons, as well as
governmental bodies.
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u.s. which provides a comparable remedy for American claimants 50° 2 No
such agreement, however, is required in the case of TAPAA vessels.503
Foreign claimants can also recover costs for clean-up and damages only
if the discharge originates from the following: an Outer Continental
Shelf facility or a deepwater port, a vessel in the navigable waters, a
vessel carrying oil as cargo between two places in the u.s., or a TAPFAA
vessel prior to its delivery of oil in the u.s.504
The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund now has a sizeable upper limit
of $1 billion (u.s.) per incident.505 The Trust Fund is available for the
payment of removal costs and the payment of governmental costs "for
assessing natural resources damages and for developing and implementing plans for the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, or acquisition of the equivalent of damaged resources."50 6 Defences to liability
0°
are only for gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the claimant.5
Evidence of financial responsibility is required for any vessel exceeding
300 gross tons and for "any vessel using the waters of the exclusive
economic zone to transship or lighter oil destined for a place subject to
508
the jurisdiction of the United States.
In sum, the new American legislation offers a streamlined claims
process, higher limits of liability (which are relatively easy to break), a
substantially increased Trust Fund, and a path breakingly broad scope of
coverage of pollution damage. It is important to note that state legislation is not pre-empted by the Act. This was a highly contentious issue
throughout the drafting of this and other attempted legislation over the
past fifteen years. Thus, states are free to implement more stringent
502

Ibid. § 1007(a)(1).

5 03

1bid § 1007(a)(2).

504

1bid. § 1007(b)(1)-(4).

505 ibid. § 9001(c). Amounts recovered under the various funds established under the Federal

Water PollutionControlAct supra, note 487, the DeepwaterPortAct of 1974, 33 U.S.CGS. §§ 1501 et
seq. (Law. Co-op. 1987), the Outer Continental ShelfLands Act Amendments of 1978, 43 U.S.C.S. §
1801 (Law. Co-op. 1980), and TAPAA, supra, note 474 are to be transferred into the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund. Ibid. § 9001(a).
506 The Trust Fund is also available for uncompensated removal costs or damages,

administration of theAct, and enforcement of provisions relating to oil pollution prevention. Ibid. §
1012(a)(1)-(5).
5 07

508

bid. § 1012(b).

Thk § 1016(a).
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provisions for waters within their jurisdiction. Although, in passing this
Act, u.s. legislators chose not to ratify the 1984 Protocols to the cLc and
the Fund Convention, the new domestic regime offers substantial environmental protection to potential victims of oil pollution damage, including
Canadians. 9
V. CONCLUSION
A. Recent Reviews
While the u.s. has responded to the latest oil spill disasters by
drafting dramatically new legislation dealing with ship source oil
pollution, Canadian officials have sought to assuage public concern by
"studying the problem." Most notable were three studies: the Federal
InternalReview on Tanker Safety and MarineSpills Response Capability,5 ' 0
consisting'primarily of reports from the Canadian Coast Guard; British
Columbia's Report to the Premieron Oil Transportationand Oil Spills,511
and the more recent federal FinalReport of the Public Review Panel on
Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability: Protecting Our
Waters.512
The Federal Internal Review consists of twenty-two separate
reports grouped into three themes: prevention, preparedness and
response, and policy/legislation issues. In its entirety, it has been
accurately characterized as focussing on "improvements to the status
quo."513 No fundamental changes of any kind are envisioned or
proposed in any of the FederalInternal Review reports. Rather, it is
generally recommended that the current legal and public policy framework be simply "fine tuned."

509 For further discussion of the Oil Pollution Act, see P.S. Edelman, "The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990" (1990) 8 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 1 and S.T. Smith, "An Analysis of the Oil Pollution Act of
1990 and the 1984 Protocols on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage" (1991) 14 Hous. J. Int'l L
115.
510
511
512
5

Supra, note 5.
Supra, note 7.
Supra, note 4.

13 Ibd. at 4.
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For example, one internal review report concludes that international tanker design standards are adequate "since they have been
universally adopted by the consensual agreement of the 133 member
states represented within the IMO. ' '5 14 On the contrary, it could be
argued that multinational safety standards in international agreements
simply represent the lowest common denominator. Certainly, the u.s.
government has made it clear that it considers many international
standards, including those of tanker design, as being inadequate.
Nonetheless, the FederalInternalReview maintains that, "in general, the
provide
current standards of tanker construction and pollution control ...

a reasonable measure of adequacy against operational and accidental
spillage of oil or chemicals from tankers. ''515 Concerning mandatory
double hulls on oil tankers, for example, the FederalInternal Review
reiterates the industry perspective in pointing out "several cogent
technical arguments against the double skin proposal," while none of the
benefits are even mentioned.
. Meanwhile, in the spring of 1989, shortly after the Exxon Valdez
disaster in Alaska, former Liberal Mp David Anderson was appointed by
British Columbia Premier Bill Vander Zalm to examine the question of
oil spill prevention, response, and compensation for pollution damage in
British Columbia. Anderson's report, entitled Oil Transportationand Oil
Spills, was released in November 1989.516 Altogether, the report contains 184 recommendations based upon research and submissions made
during informal public meetings held throughout the summer.
As with the later Public Review Panel report,51 7 Anderson
viewed prevention as the fundamental priority. Indeed, he exceeded his
terms of reference by discussing the need for energy conservation. To
this end, the report recommends that the province restore funding for
conservation measures and alternative energy sources; that an Energy
Development Agency be established (such a body was promised by the
province in 1980) aimed at stabilizing the rate of oil consumption; that
provincial taxes on petroleum products be raised to help finance some of
these initiatives; and that more energy efficient standards be adopted for
514 "Policy 3.4," supra, note 316 at 2.

515 Ibid. at 5,
516

Supra, note 7.

517

Supra, note 4.
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equipment, vehicles, and appliances 518 As well, the report proposed
that, through education and financial incentives, the provincial government encourage the recycling of lubricating oils. 5 9
Similarly, Anderson was highly critical of the increase of oil
exports through B.c. coastal waters, a phenomenon which poses a
growing threat to the local marine environment. Anderson recommended that no further expansion of crude oil exports be permitted
through the Port of Vancouver, due to that area's extreme environmental sensitivity. Existing exports, he proposed, should be phased out
altogether.5 20
Regarding tanker safety, Anderson made several technical
recommendations. The most dramatic of these was that the West Coast
barge fleet be double hulled within four years, with tankers possibly to
follow, depending on the results of studies undertaken by the Public
Review Panel and the Canadian Coast Guard. 21 Inspections were highlighted as being particularly deficient. 22 Improved safe manning
requirements were also discussed.5 23
Much of the report was devoted to oil spill response capability
and preparedness.5 24 The use of military personnel and a more formal
recognition of the role of volunteers in spill response efforts were
proposed.5 25 In addition, the creation of a joint federal/provincial Oil
Spill Response Agency was proposed, to be comprised of representatives
from government, industry, and interest groups.5 26 The agency would be
funded by means of a per litre levy on oil products transported to or
5 27
from B.C ports.

5 18

Anderson,supra, note 7 at 13-15.

519 1

at 16.

520 Ibid at 21-25.
52 1 kid. at 31.
522 ]bid. at 43-45.
523 ]bid. at 46-49.
524 Ibid. c. 4-6.
52 5

14bi at 91-92, 94, and 75.

526.rbid. at 87-88.
5271bid
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Compensation for pollution damage was also discussed.
Anderson recommended that Canada adhere to the 1984 Protocolto the
Civil Liability Convention and work within the IMO to expand the
coverage of non-economic and environmental damages under the cL.. 528
As well, he proposed that the levy for the Ship-Source Oil Pollution
Fund (ssoPp) be reinstated,5 29 and that one-third of it be used for
research, once the fund reaches $200 million. 530
In sum, much of Anderson's report differs fundamentally from
the Internal Review by focussing on the underlying issues of oil
consumption and the larger legal and policy framework surrounding the
energy issue.
Six weeks after David Anderson's appointment in B.C, the Public
Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability
was created by the Prime Minister to address the transportation of both
bulk oil and chemicals in Canadian waters. The Panel and Anderson
shared similar mandates. The Public Review Panel elicited public participation from coastal communities across Canada and, on 2 November
1990, the Panel released its final report entitled ProtectingOur Waters.531
The report contains 107 recommendations addressing questions
of prevention, preparedness, response, the legislative framework, and
funding. As well, the report contains several sections devoted to specific
local and regional issues and recommendations based on submissions
from government officials and public participants from Newfoundland,
Labrador, the Maritimes, the St. Lawrence River, the Great Lakes, the
Arctic, and the West Coast.
The Panel's report points to the continued risk of significant
future oil spills in Canadian waters and the utterly inadequate state of
preparedness and response capability to deal with such spills. Enhanced
prevention is thus emphasized as being key. On this issue, one of the
Panel's most significant recommendations was to mandate double hulls
for all Canadian tankers and tank barges within seven years and all
foreign tankers and tank barges in Canadian waters within ten years 532
528

ibid. at 106.

529 bid at 107.
530 INd
53 1

Supra, note 4.

532

Ibid. at 19-22.
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Recommendations concerning funding of the SSOPF are particularly ambitious. Currently, the Canada Shipping Act authorizes the
Minister to impose a maximum levy of 31.65 cents per tonne of oil
transported in domestic waters. 533 However, the Panel recommends that
the levy not only be reinstated, but increased to $2.00 per tonne.5 34 The
Act would be further amended so that the SSOPF would, in turn, be
additionally used to fund oil spill equipment, training programmes, and
research concerning oil spill prevention, response capability, and cleanup.535 The SSOPF would also provide funding for the implementation of
several recommendations, including the retrofitting of double hulls on
tankers and tank barges.536 It is estimated that the cost of implementing
all of the Panel's recommendations would amount to approximately $1.5
billion over a one year period; about $800 million to $1 billion of this
would be funded by the SSOpF. 537
Regarding current national and international legislation, the
report urges Canada to work within the boundaries of international law
through the auspices of the Th4o. As well, substantially raised fines for
polluters and higher compensation levels for pollution victims are
recommended.53 8 The report generally urges that the law be strengthened to make the "costs of polluting prohibitive and likelihood of getting
caught significantly higher."539 The Panel also discusses the notion of
assessing and compensating environmental damage and proposes that
legislation be enacted which would permit citizens to take civil action
against polluters5 40
Protecting Our Waters does not deal with such underlying
prevention issues as energy conservation, but it is nonetheless thorough
and comprehensive. Many of the Panel's recommendations-such as
those regarding double hulls, the ssoF, assessing environmental
533 Supra, note 59. The levy was originally set at 15 cents per tonne; its value has increased to
31.65 cents in 1990 dollars.
534 ProtectingOur Waters,supra, note 4 at 13-15.
535 Ibid
53 6 Ibid.
537bid.

538 Ibid. at 95-97.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid. at 101.
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damage, and providing for citizen civil action-are bold and progressive.
Not surprisingly, the report has drawn criticism from industry analysts,
who have labelled it "alarmist."5 41 Industry spokespeople maintain, for
example, that the recommended $2.00 levy would cause undo hardship
to Canadian oil producers, thereby threatening oil exports. 542 There is
also disagreement about the necessity for double hulls, as well as the
timing and means recommended by the Panel for their implementation.5 43
Government response to the report was cautious and noncommittal. Transport Minister Doug Lewis called the report "a hardhitting assessment of Canada's current capabilities"and touted it as part
of the government's "aggressive plan to improve the protection of
Canada's marine environment." 544 However, on specifics, for example,
the proposed double hull requirements, the reaction was particularly
vague:
The panel's conclusion that there is strong evidence that double bottoms or hulls do limit
pollution from groundings and collisions is acknowledged. Consultations will be held

to prepare a plan for phasing in this important
with tank-ship owners and operators
5 45
pollution prevention feature.

The government is quick to point out, however, that "consideration will
5 46
always be given to other designs which provide equivalent protection." '
Similarly, the government promised only that the Panel's recommended
levels of compensation, as well as recommendations concerning the
$2.00 levy and additional funding purposes of the SSOPF, "will be
examined. '5 47 In terms of effective response to pollution incidents,
requirements for training, equipment, and personnel are similarly "being
carefully examined."

541 M. Byfield, "Taxing the Tankers" (1990) 17:45 Western Report 17.
542Ibid.

543 Ibid. See also Oceans Institute of Canada, Seminar on the Findings of the PublicReview
Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Capability: Summary of Discussions (Halifax: Oceans
Institute of Canada, 1991) at 1-6.
544 Transport Canada, supra,note 11 at 1.
-545IN at 2.
546 Ibid
547

1bid.
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A recently released Coast Guard discussion paper, however,
reveals a reticent attitude towards many of the Panel's most significantand arguably, most potentially effective-proposals, including those
concerned with mandatory double hulls, reinstatement of the SSOPF levy,
and expanding the purposes of the SSOPF itself.5 48 If left to the Coast
Guard, it is increasingly apparent that the status quo will remain
essentially intact, particularly in areas which lack industry support. If
this occurs despite the host of problems and solutions identified in these
reports, the whole public participation exercise will have amounted to
little more than an expensive exercise in public relations and a serious
abuse of the time and effort of so many who were involved.
B. Recommendations
The three reviews discussed above differed greatly in the level
and character of the treatment they give to the issue of ship source oil
pollution in Canada. All, however, offered useful and potentially beneficial recommendations. This study need not repeat them, nor reiterate
the specific changes which are evidently necessary from the discussions
throughout this paper. Of greater concern is the level of political commitment we can anticipate in seeking to resolve the problem at any level.
Those who would see the status quo remain largely intact and
unchanged argue that Canadians enjoy a high standard of living in a
modern, industrialized society which is primarily based upon petroleum
products and the energy these supply. This fact is indisputable.
However, this conventional argument also assumes that, if we wish to
continue to enjoy the benefits of modern society, we must accept the
inevitable risks of transporting oil by sea. This argument contains three
erroneous assumptions.
First, proponents of this status quo view assume that the current
level of risk to the marine environment is "reasonable" and, therefore,
acceptable. Public reaction following major spill disasters is viewed as
not being fundamentally valid, but as emotional and reactionary, thus
simply posing a public relations challenge which needs to be "managed."

548 See Canadian Coast Guard, "Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills

Response Capability: Discussion Paper" (April 1991) [unpublished].
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The current legal, regulatory, and policy framework is seen as being
essentially adequate.
A second assumption is that, in order to maintain the current
national standard of living, the present quantity of petroleum products
consumed (and therefore transported) must remain the same. The
option of energy conservation and all that that entails (reduction in use,
recovery of materials, and improved energy efficiency) is greatly
underdeveloped in Canada. Similarly, it is assumed that North
Americans would be unwilling to pay more for petroleum products in
spite of the fact that Europeans generally pay much more.
Finally, it is assumed that alternative forms of energy will not be
developed in the near future and that existing alternative sources are
impractical or costly. Yet, research into clean, renewable, or "soft"
energy has been ongoing for at least two decades in spite of the fact that
funding for such work in Canada and the u.s. has been low. Few can
reasonably dispute the fact that alternatives must be sought. For all
intents and purposes, oil is a non-renewable resource and is thus
becoming increasingly difficult and costly to find and to extract.
These, then, are the underlying questions and assumptions that
must be addressed if the more symptomatic issue of marine oil pollution
is to be adequately examined. In other words, if "sustainable development" is truly the objective of Canadian decision makers, then it is
imperative that Canadians examine the fundamental issues of not only
conservation, but safe energy alternatives.
In his report to the provincial government in British Columbia,
Anderson correctly pointed to this route as ultimately the true long term
solution to the black tide of ocean oil pollution. But with expanded
domestic exports from the urban port of Vancouver, for example, energy
policy in Canada seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Even
here, however, a serious attempt to implement the recommendations
contained within the Public Review Panel's report could go a long way
toward achieving safer, cleaner waters in Canada, Yet, the Coast Guard
and federal government seem reluctant to go beyond tinkering with the
current framework and are prepared to ignore most of the significant
initiatives recommended by the federal and provincial reviews 549 As the
5 49
In researching the implementation of recommendations contained within the reviews by
Anderson, the Public Review Panel, and the U.S./British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, the
citizen's advocacy group, Callfor Inquiry, comprised of Bob Bossin, David Suzuki, and Dr. Andrew
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Public Review Panel Chair, David Brander-Smith, recently noted,
"without a very significant injection of funds, there's no question the
government is applying a Band-Aid solution to major hemorrhaging." 550
Indeed, it can be safely said that, unless sustained public attention is
applied to the issue of ship source oil pollution, Canadians will continue
to find themselves waiting-as we always have-for the next
catastrophe, with little progress to show for the interim.

Thompson, recently noted that their "research indicates that virtually all of the recommendations,
the results of millions of dollars of studies, are being ignored." The group continues, "Incredibly,
for all the excellent work of the commissions, we are little better prepared for a spill today than we
were when the first oil from the Nestucca washed up on Vancouver Island over two years ago." See
Call for Inquiry, "Alaska has learned form its mistakes, Canada has not" (Vancouver: Call for
Inquiry, 24 March 1991) at 1 and 5.
550 See L. Pynn, "Canada fails to act on lessons of Valdez spill" The Vancouver Sun (22 March
1991) B1.

